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Abstract 
In this paper we provide an analysis of the process of creative destruction across 24 countries 
and 2-digit industries over the past decade.  We rely on a newly assembled dataset that draws 
from different micro data sources (business registers, census, or representative enterprise 
surveys).  The novelty of our approach is in the harmonisation of firm level data across countries, 
which enables international comparisons and the identification of country-specific factors as 
opposed to sectoral and time effects. All countries display a massive reallocation of resources, 
with the entry and exit of many firms in all markets, the failure of many newcomers and the 
expansion of successful ones.  This  process of creative destruction affects productivity directly, 
by reallocating resources towards more productive uses, but also indirectly through the effects of 
increased market contestability. There are also large differences across groups of countries. 
While  entry and exit rates are fairly similar across industrial countries, post entry performance 
differs markedly between Europe and the U.S., a potential indication of the importance of 
barriers to firm growth as opposed to barriers to entry.  Transition economies show an even more 
impressive process of creative destruction and, amongst them, those that have progressed the 
most towards a market economy show better outcomes from this process.  Finally, Mexico shows 
large firm dynamics with many new firms entering the battle but also many failing rapidly, while 
Argentina resembles more of Continental Europe with smaller flows and less impressive post-
entry growth of successful firms.     
 
JEL classification: L11, G33, D92,    
Keywords: entry, exit, survival, firm size, productivity, micro data 
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1. Introduction   
 
 A rapidly growing number of studies provide evidence of heterogeneity in firm 
behavior, even within narrowly-defined industries or markets (see Caves, 1998; Bartelsman and 
Doms, 2000; and Ahn, 2000 for surveys). In all countries studied, there is evidence that the 
population of firms undergo significant changes over time, both through resource reallocation 
between existing firms and the process of firm entry and exit. . For the study of productivity, the 
role of within-firm productivity growth vs. the productivity growth induced by the reallocation of 
resources from less productive to more productive businesses has been the focus of much recent 
research (see, e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996), Griliches and Regev (1995) and Foster, Haltiwanger 
and Krizan (2001,2002)).   The impact of changing patterns of international trade on an economy 
is increasingly viewed through these lenses, with evolving trade relations changing the market 
structure and mix of businesses (e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). At the same time, the 
substantial churning of firms, along with the reallocation of labor across continuing firms, implies 
that workers and firms incur in significant search and other adjustment costs (see, e.g., Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 1999; and Caballero and Hammour, 2000).  As such, the efficiency of an economy 
in dealing with such reallocation is important not only for the productivity dynamics of the 
economy, but also for the dynamics of the labor market and in particular of unemployment.   For 
all of these reasons, firm-level dynamics appear to be crucial for the relative success of developed 
economies and also for the trajectories of transition and emerging economies as they develop and 
open up markets (see Eslava et. al., 2004; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Aw, Chung and Roberts, 
2002; and Brown and Earle, 2004 for studies on Latin America, East Asia and transition 
economies, respectively). 
 Much useful work on these issues has proceeded on a country-by-country basis, using 
firm-level datasets for a specific country.  But there also is a clear interest and need to combine 
data from multiple countries.  This allows in principle an assessment of how much of the 
observed dynamism at the micro level is due to industry-specific technological factors and market 
characteristics, and how much is the results of different institutional and policy settings that 
influence firm behavior and competitive forces in each market.  In this paper, we do not 
specifically address the role of policy and institutions.  Instead, we conduct exploratory data 
analysis exercises of the panel dataset exploiting the variation across countries, industries and 
time.  The dataset, constructed through ‘distributed micro-data analysis’ as described in detail in 
Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Haltiwanger (2004), includes indicators built up from (confidential) 
micro-level sources available to researchers in each of the countries included.2 
 We present evidence on the process of creative destruction in a selection of 
industrialized and developing economies. We focus on the distribution of firm-size over time, the 
frequency and size of firm entry and exit, the evolution of the (size) distribution of firms by entry-
cohort. Further, we analyze the sources of productivity growth at the industry and aggregate 
levels.  We look at the contribution of firm entry and exit to productivity growth as well as at the 
contribution coming from the reallocation of resources across existing firm.  Overall, we provide 
a comprehensive picture of the magnitude, characteristics and effectiveness of the creative 
                                                          
2.  The approach to collecting and constructing harmonized firm-level data in this project differs 
from projects like the ICA project that use the same survey instrument in a number of countries.  
A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative approaches as well as the 
relationship on key findings from the ICA dataset vs. the type of firm-level data used here is 
provided in Haltiwanger and Schweiger (2004).  Recent papers that have used the ICA data to 
study firm performance include Bastos and Nasir (2004), Dollar et. al. (2003), Hallward-
Driemeier  et al. (2003). 
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destruction process and, by exploiting the different dimensions of our data, we make the first 
attempt at understanding the sources of the observed variations across countries and industries. 
Our country dataset includes 24 economies over a period covering most of the past decade; ten 
industrial countries, five Central and Eastern European countries in transition, and nine emerging 
economies in Latin America and East Asia. These countries differ significantly along different 
dimensions including the underlying economic conditions and the policy and institutional 
settings.    
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the 
recent theory on the reasons behind firms’ heterogeneity and the importance of experimentation 
and learning by doing. In this section, we also discuss how policy and institutional settings may 
influence firm heterogeneity.  We argue that different policy settings may influence firm behavior 
in multiple ways and that several firm-level indicators are needed to assess how the different 
policy choices ultimately affect economic efficiency. In Section 3, we provide a brief description 
of the data for 24 industrial, transition and emerging economies. We then turn to the empirical 
evidence. In Section 4 we first present the distribution of firms by size; we then document the 
magnitude and key features of firm dynamics (entry and exit of firms) and, finally, we study post 
entry performance of different cohorts of new firms.  In Section 5 we analyze the effectiveness of 
creative destruction for productivity growth.  We distinguish between the productivity 
contribution coming from the process of creative destruction (entry and exit of firms) to that 
stemming from within-firm efficiency improvements and reallocation of resources across 
incumbents.    In the final section, we draw some preliminary conclusions and propose a research 
agenda to start exploring the links between policy and firm dynamics. 
2. Firm heterogeneity, market structure and institutions 
   
Stylized Facts  
 Over the past two decades, evidence has mounted suggesting sizable heterogeneity of 
firms across different interrelated dimensions, size, growth, market shares, life cycle etc.  In 
particular, some regularities have been found in the growing empirical literature, including (see 
e.g. Sutton, 1997; Pakes and Ericson, 1998, Geroski, 1995 for surveys):3  
1. Size and growth: The probability of survival tends to increase with firm (or plant) size; but, 
conditional on survival, the proportional rate of growth of a firm is decreasing in size (see 
Evans 1987a, 1987b; Dunne et al. 1988, 1989).   
2. The firm life cycle: For any given size of firm, the proportional rate of growth is smaller the 
older the firm, but its survival probability is greater (see Foster et al.  2001; and the survey of 
post entry performance of firms in the International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
1995).  
3. Shakeouts: The number of producers in a given market tends first to rise to a peak, and later 
to fall to some lower level.  Entry rates tend to be higher for more recent industries but tend 
to decline as the industry matures (Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Klepper and Simons, 1993; 
Geroski, 1995). 
                                                          
3. Amongst others, see Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996). 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001), Caves (1998) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000) offer 
further discussion of this literature. 
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4. Churning:  There is a high pace of the reallocation of outputs and inputs across businesses 
that (i) is largely within narrowly defined sectors; (ii) differs substantially across sectors and 
firm characteristics (e.g., much more churning amongst young and small businesses);and (iii)  
where entry and exit of businesses account for a substantial fraction of the variation and the 
positive correlation between gross entry rates and gross exit rates across industries helps 
account for the differences in churning rates across sectors (e.g. Geroski, 1995, Ahn, 2000 
and Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999 for surveys of the literature). 
5. Reallocation and Productivity: The pattern of reallocation is far from random.  In 
well-developed market economies, the evidence is overwhelming that the pattern of 
reallocation is productivity enhancing.  Accounting exercises show that a large fraction of 
total factor productivity and labor productivity growth at the industry level is accounted for 
by the reallocation of outputs and inputs from less productive to more productive businesses 
(see e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996, Griliches and Regev, 1995, and Foster, Haltiwanger and 
Krizan, 2001, 2002).. 
What are firms so heterogeneous? 
 These statistical regularities depict a story whereby entrant firms start business with a 
different initial size reflecting differences in their own perceived ability. Because of the inherent 
uncertainty in their potentials, even an entrant who is very successful, ex post, tends to begin with 
a smaller size at the initial stage of his life. This provides an explanation why small and young 
survivors show rapid growth. Competition continuously separates winners and losers with 
unsuccessful firms exiting the market relatively rapidly, and successful survivors growing and 
adapting. The accumulation of experience and assets, in turn, strengthens survivors and lowers 
the likelihood of failure. 
 Several theories have been developed to explain these observed patterns of firm 
dynamics survival and growth. They generally relate to the process of ‘creative destruction’ 
(usually ascribed to Joseph Schumpeter). The distinguishing element of Schumpeter’s theory 
from ‘standard’ theories of firm behavior is that it recognizes heterogeneity amongst producers 
and that the continual shift in the composition of the population of firms through entry, exit, 
expansion and contraction is essential in developing and creating new processes, products and 
markets.  
 The first two regularities are consistent with one class of models of firm learning 
process, the passive learning model of Jovanovic (1982).  In his model, a sequence of firms that 
do not know their own potential profitability enters the market.  Only after entry does the firm 
start to learn about the distribution of its own profitability based on noisy information from 
realized profits. By continually updating such learning, the firm decides to expand, contract, or to 
exit. One of the main implications of this model is that smaller and younger firms should have 
higher and more variable growth rates.  
 Cabral (1995 and 2003) offers an alternative theoretical explanation for the observed 
negative relation between firm size and growth (the so called Gibrat’s law).  His model assumes 
that firms must incur a sunk cost in building production capacity.  Since small entrants have a 
higher probability of exit than large firms, it is optimal for them to invest more gradually, and 
thus experience higher growth rates if successful, than larger entrants.  Cabral also suggests that 
financial constraints are an alternative for sunkness of capacity and technology investment.  Since 
cash constraints are expected to be less binding after start up, cash constrained start-ups should 
expect higher-than-average growth rates.         
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 Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) propose a model that is consistent with the observed 
shakeout of firms as product markets mature.  They postulate that at the beginning firms all use a 
common technology, but over time a new technology emerges which offers low unit costs but 
higher level of output per firm.  The transition to the new technology involves a shakeout of first 
generation firms, and the survival of a smaller number of firms which employ the new larger-
scale technology.  Klepper (1996) combines a stochastic growth process for firms who enter by 
developing some new products, with the idea that each firm spends some fixed amount to lower 
its unit costs.  Assuming some imperfection in capital markets and inertia in sales, larger firms 
will invest more on fixed costs for product innovation, and over time tend to displace smaller 
firms generating the shakeout.       
 The presence of high turbulence in most markets is consistent with the active learning 
model developed by Ericson and Pakes (1995).4  In their model, a firm explores its economic 
environment actively and invests to enhance its profitability under competitive pressure from both 
within and outside the industry. Its potential and actual profitability changes over time in 
response to the stochastic outcomes of the firm’s own investment, and those of other actors in the 
same market. The firm grows if successful, shrinks or exits if unsuccessful.  
 Vintage models of technological change also offer possible explanations for the 
observed regularities in firm dynamics and performance. These models stress that new 
technology is often embodied in new capital which often requires a retooling process in existing 
plants (see e.g. Solow, 1960; Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power, 1997). Related to this idea are 
models (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 1994; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Campbell, 1997) 
that emphasize the potential role of entry and exit: if new technology can be better harnessed by 
new firms, productivity growth will be dependent upon the entry of new units of production that 
displace outpaced establishments. Moreover, the existence of sunk costs implies that new firms 
using the “state-of-the-art” production technology coexist with older and less productive firms 
generating the observed heterogeneity.  
 In this paper, we look at harmonized firm-level data for several industrial, transition and 
developing countries to seek confirmation of the statistical regularities highlighted in previous 
studies and to assess the possible sources of firm heterogeneity exploiting cross sectoral and well 
as cross-country variations.  As such, this is the first paper, to our knowledge, to exploit a cross-
country sample beyond industrialized countries. 
The Role of Market Structure and Institutions 
 It is tempting at first glance to hypothesize that countries -- and/or sectors -- where the 
creative destructive process is distorted in some manner will have less churning and lower 
productivity levels and productivity growth rates.  Indeed, it is not hard to take extreme versions 
of the models discussed in the prior section and generate just this prediction.  That is, making 
entry and exit (and adjustment more generally) prohibitively costly via distorted market structure 
and institutions will lead to a reduced pace of churning and lower productivity (see, e.g., Davis 
and Haltiwanger, 1999 for the illustration of this prediction in a calibration exercise using an 
extreme example where all reallocation is shutdown).  Taken literally, this prediction can be 
tested by examining the variation by country, sector and year in our harmonized data and relating 
                                                          
4.  Various empirical papers have attempted to identify passive and active learning processes. For 
example, using US data, Pakes and Ericson (1998) claim that manufacturing firms are more 
consistent with the active learning model whilst retailing firms are more consistent with the 
passive learning model. 
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such variation to country, sector and year variations in institutions.  Even more simply, the 
immediate temptation is to test this prediction implicitly by examining the rank ordering of firm 
turnover and productivity dynamics across countries and to match that rank ordering up with 
priors about the rank ordering of market structure and institutions across countries.   
 However, further reflections suggest that the predictions regarding distortions in market 
structure and institutions are in fact not so clear.  The reason is that distortions may affect the 
reallocation dynamics on different margins in a variety of ways.  For example, artificially high 
barriers to entry will lead to reduced firm turnover and to a less efficient allocation of resources.  
But given the high barrier to entry (and in turn the implied ability of marginal incumbents to 
increase survival probabilities), the average productivity of entrants will rise while the average 
productivity of incumbents and exiting businesses will fall.  Similar predictions apply to policies 
that subsidize incumbents and/or restrict exit in some fashion.  The point is that institutional 
distortions might yield a larger gap in productivity between entering and exiting businesses. 
 Alternatively, some types of distortions in market structure and institutions might make 
the entry and exit process less rational (i.e., less driven by market fundamentals but more by 
random factors).  Such randomness may be associated with either a higher or lower pace of 
churning.  Pure randomness would, in principle, increase the pace of churning but the random 
factors might be correlated with other factors (e.g., firm size) and thus the impact would be to 
distort the relationship between churning and such factors with less clear predictions on the 
overall pace of churning.  In any event, such randomness would imply less systematic differences 
between entering, exiting and incumbent businesses – in the extreme when all entry and exit is 
random there should be no differences between entering, exiting and incumbent businesses. 
 Another related problem is that a business climate that encourages more market 
experimentation might have a larger long run contribution but a smaller short run contribution 
from the creative destruction process.  That is, the greater market experimentation may be 
associated with more risk and uncertainty in the short run so that it is only after the trial and error 
process of the experimentation has worked its way out (through learning and selection effects) 
that the productivity payoff is realized.  Thus, a business climate that encourages market 
experimentation might have a lower short run contribution from entry and exit but a higher long 
run contribution from entry and exit.   
 In short, the gap between the productivity of entering and exiting businesses is not by 
itself sufficient to gauge the contribution or efficiency of the creative destruction process.  In 
addition, different types of distortions might be acting simultaneously in a country.  It might be 
that different policies act to subsidize incumbents (preferential treatment for incumbents), other 
policies artificially increase the barriers to entry (poorly functioning financial markets and/or 
regulatory barriers), while other policies make exit more random for some types of businesses 
(e.g., poorly functioning financial markets for young and small businesses).  As such, there might 
be too little churning on some dimensions and too much on others, the gap between entering and 
exiting businesses might be too large on some margins and too small on others.   
  All of these remarks suggest the need for both caution and creativity in using the 
firm demographic and productivity dynamic statistics that we analyze below.  On the one hand, 
even this brief discussion makes clear that simple cross country comparisons on specific 
dimensions may be misleading or inadequate.  On the other hand, this discussion suggests that 
creativity needs to be used to examine the connection between the churning and productivity 
dynamics along multiple dimensions.  In like fashion, this discussion helps make clear why it is 
likely important to exploit variation beyond simple country variation but instead exploit variation 
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on additional dimensions like sector and size using difference-in-differences (e.g., exploiting 
differences in the cross-industry variation across countries). 
 As will become clear in our discussion of the data in the next section, limitations in the 
data in different dimensions across countries and compromises that were made to generate 
‘comparable’ data, may hamper analysis of certain questions and generally suggest caution in 
interpreting simple cross country differences.    We now turn to a discussion of the data. 
3. A new dataset of firm-level data from industrial and developing countries  
 
 The dataset used in the study was collected in various stages. Most recently, the 
firm-level project organized by the World Bank collected indicators for 14 countries (Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan.(China)) An earlier OECD study collected indicators based 
on information on firms from: Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States.  
 These projects made use of a common analytical framework and the data analysis and 
collection was conducted by active experts in each of the countries.5 The framework involves the 
harmonization, to the extent possible, of key concepts (e.g. entry, exit, or the definition of the unit 
of measurement) as well as the definition of common methodologies for studying firm-level data. 
The methodology for collecting the country/industry/time panel dataset built up from underlying 
micro-level datasets has been referred to as ‘distributed micro-data analysis’ (Bartelsman 2004). 
A detailed technical description of the dataset may be found in Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and 
Scarpetta (2004). 
 The distributed micro-data analysis was conducted for two separate analytical themes. 
The first set of analyses gathered data relating to firm demographics, such as entry and exit, jobs 
flows, size distribution and firm survival. The second theme gathered indicators of movements of 
firms and resources related to productivity, such as productivity contributions of entry/exit and 
other measures of resource reallocation.  The synthetic indicators used in the analysis for these 
two themes are discussed in details in Box 1.    
 The analysis of firm demographics is based on business registers, census, social security 
databases, or employment-based register containing information on both establishments and firms 
(see Table 1). Data for the analysis of productivity growth come more frequently from business 
surveys.  Using these data, time-series indicators on firm demographics were generated for 
                                                          
5.  In addition to the authors of this paper, the researchers involved in the distributed micro-data 
analysis network for the various projects are: John Baldwin (Canada); Tor Erickson (Denmark); 
Seppo Laaksonen, Mika Maliranta, and Satu Nurmi (Finland); Bruno Crépon and Richard 
Duhautois (France); Thorsten Schank (Germany);  Fabiano Schivardi (Italy); Karin 
Bouwmeester, Ellen Hoogenboom and Robert Sparrow (the Netherlands);  Pedro Portugal Dias 
(Portugal); Ylva Heden (Sweden); Jonathan Haskel, Matthew Barnes, and Ralf Martin (United 
Kingdom); Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda (United States); Gabriel Sánchez (Argentina), Marc 
Muendler and Adriana Schor (Brazil), Andrea Repetto (Chile), Maurice Kugler (Colombia and 
Venezuela), David Kaplan (Mexico), John Earle (Hungary and Romania), Mihails Hazans 
(Latvia), Raul Eamets and Jaan Maaso (Estonia), Mark Roberts (Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan 
(China)), Milan Vodopivec (Slovenia). 
 7
disaggregated sectors for each country. The classification into about 40 sectors (roughly the 2-
digit level detail of ISIC Rev3) coincides with the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database.6   
 The other set of indicators in the dataset concerns productivity and its components. The 
data sources used for the analysis of productivity differ from those used for firm demographics in 
many countries. For productivity measures, data are needed on output, employment and possibly 
other productive inputs such as intermediate materials and capital services. Using these source 
data, indicators are calculated on labor productivity by industry and year, and on the 
decomposition of productivity growth into within-firm and reallocation components (see below).  
Box 1 Main indicators available in the firm-level database 
The use of annual data on firm dynamics implies a significant volatility in the resulting indicators. In order 
to limit the possible impact of measurement problems, it was decided to use definitions of continuing, 
entering and exiting firms on the basis of three (rather than the usual two) time periods. Thus, the 
tabulations of firm demographics contained the following variables: 
Entry: The number of firms entering a given industry in a given year. Also tabulated, where available, 
was the number of employees in entering firms. Entrant firms (and their employees) were those 
observed as (out, in, in) the register in time (t – 1, t, t +1). 
 
Exit: The number of firms that leave the register and the number of people employed in these firms. 
Exiting firms were those observed as (in, in, out) the register in time (t – 1, t, t +1). 
 
One-year firms: The number of firms and employees in those firms that were present in the register 
for only one year. These firms were those observed as (out, in, out) the register in time (t – 1, t, t +1). 
 
Continuing firms: The number of firms and employees that were in the register in a given year, as 
well as in the previous and subsequent year. These firms were observed as (in, in, in) the register in 
time (t – 1, t, t +1). 
 
 The above indicators were split into 8 firm-size classes including the class of firms without 
employees.7 The data thus allow detailed comparisons of firm-size distributions between industries and 
countries.  
Firm survival: available data allow to track entering firms over time, This allows to calculate survival 
probabilities over the initial life of firms and to assess their changes in employment over time.  
Decomposition of productivity growth: The database includes different types of productivity 
decomposition for manufacturing industries and some service industries.  Depending on the availability of 
output and input measures, productivity data are available in the database with reference to labor 
productivity, multifactor productivity using either gross output or value added as the indicator of output 
(see Bartelsman et al. 2004 for more details).  In this paper, the analysis is limited to labor productivity, 
generally defined as deflated gross output per worker. Firm level nominal values of output are deflated at 
the industry level 
  
                                                          
6. See www.oecd.org/data/stan.htm 
7.  For the OECD countries there are only 6 groups, with the groups between 1 and 20 combined 
and the groups between 100 and 500 combined. 
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Table 1. Data sources  
 
 Firm demographics and survival  Labor productivity  
Country Source Period Threshold Source Period Threshold Sectors 
Canada  Business register 84-98 Emp ≥ 1    All Economy 
Denmark  Business register 81-94 Emp ≥ 1    All  
Finland  Business register 88-98 Emp ≥ 1 Census 95-00 to 97-02  All  
France  Fiscal database 89-97 
Turnover:  
Man: Euro 3.8m 
Serv: Euro 1.1m Fiscal database 
85-90 to 90-95 Turnover:  
Man: Euro 
3.8m   All  
Germany (West)  Social security 77-99 Emp ≥ 1 
Survey, pop. 
weighted 
95-00 to 97-02  All but civil 
service,  
self employed 
Italy  Social security  86-94 Emp ≥ 1 Survey 
82-87 to 93-98 Turnover: 
Euro 5m 
  All 
Netherlands  Business register 87-97 None 
Survey, pop. 
weighted 
94-99 to 1996-01 
Private Business 
Portugal 
 Employment-
based register 83-98 Emp ≥ 1 
Employment-
based register 
86-91 & 89-94  All but public  
administration 
United Kingdom  Business register 80-98 Emp ≥ 1 
Survey, pop. 
weighted 
95-00 & 96-01  
Manufacturing 
USA  Business register 88-97 Emp ≥ 1 Census 87-92 to 92-97 Emp>1 Private businesses
Argentina 
Register, based on 
Integrated System 
of Pensions 95-02 
Emp ≥ 1 Annual Industrial 
Survey. INDEC 
90-95 to 96-01 Emp ≥ 9 & 
$2m 
threshold 
Firm 
demographics = 
all; productivity = 
manufacturing 
Brazil Census 96-01 
 Annual Industrial 
Survey 
1997-2001 Emp ≥30 + 
sample of 
10-29 Manufacturing 
Chile 
Annual Industry 
Survey (ENIA) 79-99 Emp. ≥ 10 
Annual Industry 
Survey (ENIA) 
80-85 to 94-99 Emp. ≥ 10 
Manufacturing 
Colombia 
Annual 
Manufacturing 
survey (EAM) 82-98 Emp. ≥ 10 
Annual 
Manufacturing 
survey (EAM) 
82-86 to 94-98 Emp. ≥ 10 
Manufacturing 
Estonia Business Register 95-01 
Emp ≥ 1 Business register 95-00 to 96-01 Emp ≥ 1 All 
Hungary 
Fiscal register 
(APEH) 92-01 Emp ≥ 1 
Fiscal register 
(APEH) 
92-96 to 97-01 Emp>1 All 
Indonesia 
Manufacturing 
survey 90-95 Emp. ≥ 10 
Manufacturing 
survey 
90-95  Emp. ≥ 10 
Manufacturing 
Korea (Rep.) Census 
83-93 (3 
years) Emp ≥ 5 Census 
88 & 93 Emp ≥ 5 Manufacturing 
Latvia Business register 96-02 Emp ≥ 1 Business register 96-01 97-02 Emp ≥ 1 All 
Mexico Social security 85-01 Emp ≥ 1  
  
All 
Romania  Business register 92-01 Emp ≥ 1 Business register 95-98 to 96-99 Emp ≥ 1 All 
Slovenia  Business register 92-01 Emp ≥ 1 Business register
92-97 to 97-01 Emp>1 All 
Taiwan (China) Census 
86-91 (2 
years) Emp ≥ 1 Census 
86-91 to 91-96 Emp ≥ 1 Manufacturing 
Venezuela 
Annual Industrial 
Survey 95-00 
Emp ≥ 15, sample 
of smaller 
Annual Industrial 
Survey 
95-99 to 96-00 Emp ≥ 5 
Manufacturing 
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4. Assessing the process of creative destruction  
 
The distribution of firms by size: sectoral specialization or framework conditions  
 The first step in our analysis of creative destruction is to look at the distribution of firm 
by size across countries and industries.  Firm size is an important dimension in our analysis for 
several reasons.  As discussed above, small firms seem to be affected by greater churning, but 
also have greater potential for expansion.  Thus, a distribution of firms skewed towards small 
units may imply higher entry and exit, but also greater post entry growth of successful firms.  
Alternatively, it may point to a sectoral specialization of the given country towards newer 
industries, where churning tends to be larger and more firms experiment with different 
technologies.  However, as for all our firm-level indicators, any observed difference in one single 
indicator – like firm size --   cannot, per se, be taken to indicate differences in the magnitude or 
characteristics of creative destruction.  The distribution of firm by size is likely to be influenced 
by the overall dimension of the internal market – especially for non-tradeables – as well as the 
business environment in which firms operate that can discourage firm expansion (see below).  So, 
the analysis of firm size should be taken as one of the aspects that together with the others on firm 
demographics and the productivity decomposition will enable to identify a coherent story about 
cross-country differences in creative destruction.       
 It should be stressed at the outset that our analysis is affected by the different thresholds 
used on firm size.  For most countries the data cover all firms with at least one employee. But the 
cutoff size is 5 employees in South Korea and Venezuela (with a random sample of smaller),8 10 
employees in Chile, Colombia and Indonesia.  Second, even amongst the countries for which data 
cover all firms with at least one employee, data may be at the establishment level instead of the 
plant level, and the definition of both may vary across countries. Third, data for some countries 
are based on other selection criteria, which might induce some bias in the results which cannot be 
determined a priori (e.g. in France data exclude firms with a turnover below a given threshold). 
Finally, from a sectoral perspective, community services and utilities are more difficult to 
compare, given the important role of the public sector, whose coverage changes from country to 
country, and of regulation in these sectors.  
 Table 2 suggests that in all countries the population of firms is dominated by micro 
units (with less than 20 employees).9  They account for at least 80 per cent of the total firm 
population.  Their share in total employment is much lower and ranges from less than 15 percent 
in some transition economies (e.g. Romania) -- which still reflects the presence of large (formerly 
or still) state-owned firms inherited from the central plan period -- to less than 20 percent in the 
United States and around 30 per cent or more in some small European economies.10  
                                                          
8.  However, the enterprise survey in Venezuela is representative of all firms with at least 15 
employees, and only includes a random sample of firms below this threshold.  In our analysis, 
we have used the data for Venezuela with reference to firms with 20+ employees, given the lack 
of coverage for the lover size classes.  
9.  For proper comparability, the Table excludes all countries for which the size threshold is 5 or 10 
employees instead of one.  
10.  The Table reports the share of firms with fewer than 20 employees over the total number of 
firms or total employment for the countries for which we have all firms with at least 1 employee.  
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Table 2.  Small firms across broad sectors and countries, 1990s 
(firms with fewer than 20 employees as a percentage of total) 
Total 
economy
Non-
Agriculture 
Business 
Sector (1) Manufacturing
Total 
services
Total 
economy
Non-
Agriculture 
Business 
Sector (1) Manufacturing
Total 
services
Industrial countries
Denmark 91.3 89.5 76.6 92.3 32.7 31.1 17.6 35.0
France 82.1 82.3 77.9 82.0 15.9 16.0 19.9 13.6
Italy 93.8 93.8 88.6 96.0 35.9 39.6 31.3 36.4
Netherlands 96.3 96.5 88.3 97.1 31.8 36.8 18.3 32.9
Finland 93.6 92.7 85.4 95.3 29.5 32.7 13.5 39.1
West Germany 89.6 85.8 83.3 0.0 25.8 23.8 16.6 0.0
Portugal 89.2 88.9 75.3 93.8 32.2 31.4 18.9 42.9
UK 81.3 12.4
USA 88.0 88.0 72.6 88.7 18.4 19.3 6.7 19.9
Latin America
Brazil 82.4 17.7
Mexico 90.1 90.0 82.8 92.2 23.2 24.5 13.9 28.5
Argentina 90.0 89.4 82.1 91.2 27.7 27.7 21.3 27.7
Transition economies
Slovenia 87.7 88.0 71.6 93.1 13.4 13.5 5.1 26.0
Hungary 84.4 85.5 71.1 90.8 16.0 16.4 8.8 23.6
Estonia 80.6 81.3 64.6 87.1 22.8 22.6 11.5 34.2
Latvia 87.7 87.7 87.8 87.6 24.7 24.8 26.9 24.2
Romania 90.9 91.5 77.1 95.6 12.9 12.8 4.2 31.6
East Asia
Korea2 57.0 11.1
Taiwan 82.5 26.6
* Share of Employment with less than 20 employees
(1) This aggregates excludes agriculture (ISIC 1-5) and community services (ISIC3: 75-79)
(2) In Korea, data cover firms with 5 or more employees. 
Firms Employment*
 
 
 Average firm size in aggregate manufacturing or business services in some countries 
may largely result from a specialization towards industries with a small efficient scale.  To assess 
the role of sectoral specialization versus within sector differences we need a more disaggregated 
analysis based on a shift-and-share decomposition. The idea behind this technique is to determine 
how much of the overall deviation of average size from a given benchmark (in our case the cross-
country average) is due to country specialization in sectors with different underlying 
technological and size characteristics and how much to the fact that average size within sectors 
tends to be different from that of the benchmark. For example, it could be that overall larger size 
of manufacturing in the United States is mostly due to the fact that the United States has a 
productive structure specialized in sectors with large size. The decomposition exploits the 
following identity: ∑= i ijijj ss ω , where js  is the average firm size in manufacturing in country 
j,  sij  is the average firm size in sub-sector i and ijω  is the share of firms in sub-sector i with 
respect to the total number of firms in manufacturing. Define now s  as the overall mean in 
manufacturing across countries and iω  as the share of overall number of firms in sub-sector j. 
Then the difference between country j and overall mean can be decomposed as follows: 
=−−+−+−=−=− ∑∑∑∑∑ i iijiiji iiiijiii iji iii ijijj sssssssss ))(()()( ωωωωωωω  
 
                                   = ∆ω + ∆s + ∆ωs                 [1] 
 
 The first term accounts for differences in the sectoral composition of firms, the second 
for cross-country differences in firm size within each sector and the last an interaction term, 
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which can be interpreted loosely as an indicator of covariance: if it is positive, size and sectoral 
compositions deviate from the benchmark in the same direction.  
 The decomposition (Table 3) suggests that within sector differences generally play the 
most important role in explaining differences in overall size across countries: this component is 
much larger (in absolute terms) that the sectoral composition in many countries.11  The within-
industry size component is particularly large in the United States, confirming the idea that a larger 
internal market tends to promote larger firms, but also in some transition economies (Slovenia 
and especially Romania) where some very large firms of the central-plan period have survived 
during the transition.  However, the sectoral composition also play an important role – similar to 
the within sector component – in some small European countries such as Denmark and Portugal 
but also in a relatively larger country like France and an emerging economy like Mexico.  These 
results suggest that both the size structure and the sectoral composition should be controlled for 
when analyzing firms dynamics and its effects on aggregate performance.       
Table 3.  Shift and share analysis of the determinants of firm size 
Country
Sectoral 
composition
Average 
Size of 
Firms
Interaction 
between sectoral 
comp. and size Total
Denmark 0.14 -0.03 -0.09 0.01
France 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
Italy -0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.20
Netherlands 0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.16
Finland -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09
Portugal -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.07
UK -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
USA 0.00 0.42 -0.07 0.34
Canada 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01
Brazil 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09
Mexico 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02
Argentina 0.04 -0.14 -0.02 -0.12
Slovenia 0.01 0.30 -0.07 0.24
Hungary 0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.12
Estonia -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06
Latvia -0.03 -0.20 0.04 -0.20
Romania 0.08 0.97 -0.36 0.68
Korea 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.18
Taiwan 0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.14
The Total  represents the percentage deviation of average size from the cross-country average:
the other columns decompose the total into sub-components
contribution coming from differences in:
 
 The decomposition also suggests that the sectoral composition and differences within 
sectors are not highly correlated: the interaction term is negative in most cases, and the sign of the 
sectoral composition and within sector terms is equal in only a few cases. These results do not 
support the hypothesis that if a country has an institutional setting that favors a certain size 
structure, say large firms, it is also characterized both by large firms within sector and a sectoral 
specialization tilted towards productions naturally characterized by large firms (Davis and 
Henrekson, 1999).   
                                                          
11.  In a sensitivity analysis, we have also replicated the decomposition for the sample of OECD 
countries and the non-OECD countries (including also Hungary and Mexico) separately. The 
results are broadly unchanged in the two sub-samples.  Moreover, we have replicated the 
decomposition at a finer level of sectoral disaggregation and again the results are broadly 
unchanged.     
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 It is also interesting to look at the dispersion of firm by size within each sector of the 
economy and to see whether cross-country differences in the dispersion differ across sectors of 
the economy.  Table 4 presents coefficient of variation of firm size, normalized by the overall 
cross-country coefficient of variation.12  If technological factors were predominant in determining 
the heterogeneity of firm size across countries, we should find that the values in the country 
columns in Table 3 to be concentrated around one. If, on the contrary, the size differences were 
explained mainly by national factors inducing a consistent bias within sectors, then we would 
expect the countries with an overall value above (below) the average (i.e. in the “Total” category) 
to be characterized by values generally above (below) one in the sub-sectors.  The first element 
emerging from the table is that there are clear sectoral patterns which persist across countries.  
Service sector activities display greater within-industry dispersion in firm size.  This is due to the 
higher degree of aggregation of most service sectors compared with manufacturing and to the fact 
that in most service industries small businesses coexist with large multi-plant enterprises.  Within 
manufacturing, high-tech industries (electrical equipment, motor vehicles) have a greater 
dispersion in firm size than other more traditional manufacturing activities.   
 From a country perspective, industrial economies seem to have a greater dispersion in 
firm size, within each sector, than the other countries.  And within the industrial countries, the 
United States show a much larger dispersion in firm size, even controlling for the greater average 
size of firms: in total manufacturing the dispersion in the US is double that in the average of 
industrial countries (even controlling for differences in average size) and the differences are even 
larger in some high-tech industries such as those related to the information and communication 
technology (ICT).  Amongst transition economies, the transport sector still accounts for much of 
the overall variation being characterized by the presence of old state-owned firms together with 
new private (and generally smaller) ventures, while in the emerging economies of Latin America 
and especially East Asia the within-sector dispersion in firm size tend to be smaller than in the 
industrial countries.  Still, it is interesting that every country but Finland has at least one sector 
with greater dispersion than the cross-country average and every country but the U.S. has at least 
one sector (and typically many) with less dispersion than the cross-country average.      
 All in all, overall differences in average firm size are largely driven by within-sector 
differences, although in some countries sectoral specialization also plays a significant role. 
Smaller countries tend to have a size distribution skewed towards smaller firms, but the average 
size of firms as well as the dispersion within and across countries do not map precisely with the 
overall dimension of the domestic market.  The United States tend to have larger firms and wider 
dispersion within most industries.  Other industrial countries, including France, UK, Portugal, 
also have relatively larger shares of large firms, but not necessarily large dispersion in firm size 
within industries.  Significant differences are also found across emerging and transition 
economies.  While some common patterns can be identified amongst transition economies and 
can be easily linked to remaining elements of the central plan period, no single factor can be 
brought to explain the observed cross-country differences in the other countries.  Overall, these 
results point to the possible influence of differences in business environment conditions in 
shaping firm characteristics and the degree of heterogeneity of firms in the economy and further 
encourage us to continue our journey into the firm level analysis. 
                                                          
12.  We use the coefficient of variation because the dispersion of size across industries or countries is 
not independent from the average size: sectors (or countries) with larger size also tend to display 
higher standard deviations.  
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Table 4  Within-industry coefficient of variation of firm size 
 (as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-country 
average Mexico Slovenia Hungary Korea Taiwan Estonia Brazil Latvia Romania Argentina
Sectors
Total economy 12.4 0.94 0.52 1.09 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.63 0.66 1.60 0.77
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry And Fishing 6.3 1.46 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.86 0.62
Mining And Quarrying 5.7 0.71 0.60 0.56 0.84 1.62 0.39 0.67
total manufacturing 7.5 0.78 0.49 0.66 0.74 0.77 0.40 1.04 0.64 1.29 0.68
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 5.8 1.08 0.33 0.56 0.56 2.40 0.39 1.56 1.18 0.94
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 4.0 1.06 0.89 0.68 1.06 0.83 0.63 1.74 0.91 1.17
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 3.2 1.02 0.81 0.92 1.09 1.07 0.63 1.07 1.23 1.28
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 5.9 0.64 0.73 0.71 0.46 0.74 0.37 0.99 0.62 2.23 0.62
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 2.7 0.63 0.67 1.09 0.97 0.37 1.22 0.30 0.44 1.87
Chemicals And Chemical Products 4.4 0.81 0.66 0.96 0.62 1.54 0.54 1.04 0.44 0.93 0.73
Rubber And Plastics Products 3.9 0.72 1.34 0.76 0.75 1.13 0.41 0.99 0.50 1.45 0.69
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 4.2 1.16 0.56 0.70 0.67 0.73 0.42 0.95 0.76 0.80 0.84
Basic Metals 4.6 1.19 0.45 0.66 1.11 0.60 0.24 1.75 0.23 0.95 1.57
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 3.7 1.12 1.09 0.86 1.11 0.81 0.49 1.23 0.68 1.17 0.73
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 4.7 0.67 0.83 0.93 0.65 0.47 1.09 0.87 0.96 0.52
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 5.3 0.27 0.77 0.49 0.77 0.22 0.79 0.46 0.90 0.25
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 5.1 0.60 1.35 0.59 1.00 0.62 1.19 0.28 0.70 0.53
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 5.3 0.54 0.67 1.09 0.85 0.84 0.65 0.66 0.85
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 5.1 0.78 0.79 0.62 0.45 0.49 0.72 0.83 0.62 0.40
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 6.6 0.61 0.46 0.57 1.24 0.69 0.37 1.51 0.15 0.49 0.88
Other Transport Equipment 5.6 0.79 0.39 0.48 1.33 1.18 0.50 1.24 0.31 0.43 0.63
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 4.1 1.18 0.63 0.63 1.04 0.70 0.79 0.97 0.50 1.04 0.52
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 5.8 1.69 0.26 0.43 1.15 0.52 1.10 0.84
Construction 5.0 0.81 0.75 0.67 0.36 0.89 1.09 0.87
Services 15.9 0.95 0.64 1.50 0.39 0.55 2.33 0.72
---bus sector services 17.1 0.69 0.62 1.42 0.37 0.51 2.23 0.63
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 10.0 0.79 0.55 0.68 0.23 0.47 0.80 1.04
Transport And Storage And Communication 15.8 0.64 0.71 1.25 0.44 0.92 1.65 0.76
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 11.8 1.19 0.58 0.95 0.25 0.59 0.45 0.73
Community Social And Personal Services 9.3 1.92 0.41 0.62 0.23 0.85 1.11 1.25
(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-country 
average Industrial Other countries France Italy Netherlands Finland Portugal UK USA
Sectors
Total economy 12.4 1.19 0.87 1.69 1.35 0.31 0.68 2.36
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry And Fishing 6.3 1.23 0.81 2.07 0.56 0.48 0.66 1.92
Mining And Quarrying 5.7 1.31 0.68 1.26 1.24 0.97 0.31 0.52 3.55
total manufacturing 7.5 1.28 0.74 1.04 2.18 1.19 0.49 0.48 1.03 2.83
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 5.8 1.14 0.85 0.77 1.51 0.86 0.42 0.51 0.82 2.96
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 4.0 1.04 0.96 0.67 0.93 0.98 0.55 0.67 1.15 2.32
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 3.2 1.01 0.99 0.74 0.81 0.87 0.74 0.87 1.18 1.76
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 5.9 1.15 0.86 0.59 2.33 0.73 0.66 0.48 0.74 2.46
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 2.7 1.26 0.77 0.90 1.61 0.89 0.43 0.75 1.53 2.71
Chemicals And Chemical Products 4.4 1.24 0.78 1.50 1.11 0.90 0.65 0.66 0.93 2.70
Rubber And Plastics Products 3.9 1.11 0.90 0.83 1.82 0.64 0.48 0.49 0.95 2.52
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 4.2 1.21 0.81 1.03 1.27 0.91 0.59 0.64 1.05 2.81
Basic Metals 4.6 1.20 0.84 2.50 1.59 0.72 0.57 0.82 1.63
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 3.7 1.04 0.97 0.80 0.91 0.59 0.77 0.96 2.10
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 4.7 1.19 0.77 1.02 1.45 0.54 0.68 0.44 1.06 2.88
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 5.3 1.46 0.53 2.00 1.49 0.58 0.20 1.16 3.63
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 5.1 1.22 0.74 1.28 1.35 0.78 0.67 1.01 0.99 2.21
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 5.3 1.25 0.69 1.26 1.86 2.21 0.48 0.58 1.38 2.07
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 5.1 1.27 0.68 1.64 1.06 1.00 0.68 0.65 0.95 2.68
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 6.6 1.46 0.58 0.76 2.76 0.94 0.52 0.54 1.47 3.48
Other Transport Equipment 5.6 1.44 0.59 1.16 1.74 1.88 1.00 0.70 1.61 2.57
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 4.1 1.19 0.82 1.46 0.77 1.66 0.55 0.51 0.96 2.66
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 5.8 1.09 0.91 0.52 3.14 0.26 0.44 0.73 1.68
Construction 5.0 1.21 0.80 1.12 1.39 1.03 0.43 1.07 2.28
Services 15.9 0.94 1.05 0.72 1.23 1.21 0.20 0.79 1.83
---bus sector services 17.1 1.06 0.95 0.68 1.53 1.48 0.18 0.79 2.17
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 10.0 1.35 0.68 0.93 0.96 1.17 0.21 0.49 4.20
Transport And Storage And Communication 15.8 1.10 0.91 0.31 1.85 1.81 0.30 0.82 2.14
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 11.8 1.26 0.76 0.89 1.85 2.31 0.23 0.85 2.36
Community Social And Personal Services 9.3 0.94 1.04 0.87 1.16 1.03 0.50 1.32
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The creative destruction process: gross and net firm flows  
 The second obvious step in our analysis is to look at the magnitude and characteristics of 
firm creation and destruction.  Figure 1 shows entry and exit rates averaged over time (1989 
onwards) for the business sector and for manufacturing. Confirming one of the key regularities 
highlighted in the previous literature, the Figure point to a high degree of turbulence in all 
countries.  Many firms enter and exit most markets every year. Limiting the tabulations to firms 
with at least 20 employees to maximize the country coverage, total firm turnover (entry plus exit 
rates)13 is in between 3-8 per cent in most industrial countries and more than 10 per cent in some 
of the transition economies.  Extending the tabulations to also include micro units (1 to 19 
employees) increases total turnover to between one-fifth and one-fourth of all firms.  These data 
confirm previous findings that in all countries net entry (entry minus exit) is far less important 
than the gross flows of entry and exit that generate it.  This suggests that the entry of new firms in 
the market is largely driven by a search process rather than augmenting the number of 
competitors in the market (a point also highlighted by Audretsch, 1995).   
There are also interesting differences across countries. In transition economies firm entry 
largely out-paced firm exit, while more balanced patterns are found in other countries.  Obviously 
this is related to the process of transition and is not sustainable over the longer run.  Still it points 
to the fact that new firms not only displaced obsolete incumbents in the transition phase but also 
filled in new markets which were either nonexistent or poorly populated in the past.  This is also 
reflected in the discrepancies between firm entry and exit across firm size.  The Latin America 
region shows a wide variety of experiences: while Mexico, Chile (manufacturing) and Venezuela 
(manufacturing) show vigorous firm turnover, Colombia and especially Argentina show less 
turbulence, closer to the values observed in some Continental European countries.      
 
Figure 1.  Firm turnover rates in broad sectors, 1990s 
Panel A: Manufacturing, firms with 20 or more employees 
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13. The entry rate is defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of incumbent 
and entrants firms producing in a given year; the exit rate is defined as the number of firms 
exiting the market in a given year divided by the population of origin, i.e. the incumbents in the 
previous year.  
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Panel B: Manufacturing, firms with at least 1 employee 
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Panel C: Total business sector, firms 20 or more employees 
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Panel D: Total business sector, firms with at least 1 employee 
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 Data for the transition economies clearly show the role of market forces in shaping firm 
dynamics (Figure 2).  At the beginning of their transition to a market economy, both gross and net 
firm flows were large compared to industrial and other emerging economies:  in some of the 
transition economies a large fraction of firms were closed down and replaced by new small 
ventures, and this process accounted for more than 10 percent of total employment.  As the 
transition moved forward gross and especially net flows declined to reach, at the end of the 
1990s, values fairly close to those observed in other countries.     
Figure 2: The evolution of gross and net firm flows in transition economies, business sector 
Panel A:  Gross firm flows  
Slovenia Hungary
Latvia Romania
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Gross firm flows Net firm flows
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
94 95 96 97 98 99
Gross firm flows Net firm flows
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
94 95 96 97
Gross firm flows Net firm flows
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
94 95 96 97 98 99
Gross firm flows Net firm flows
Panel B: Employment-weighted firm flows 
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 The high turnover rates amongst small firms suggest that the process of entry and exit of 
firms involves a proportionally low number of workers.  Indeed, including all firms with at least 1 
employee suggests that less than 10 per cent of employment is, on average, involved in firm 
creation and destruction.  The difference between un-weighted and employment-weighted firm 
turnover rates arises from the fact that both entrants and exiting firms are generally smaller than 
incumbents. For most countries, new firms are only 20 to 60 per cent the average size of 
incumbents (Figure 3).   
Figure 3. Relative firm size of entering and exiting firms relative to the average incumbent 
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 The small size of entrants relative to the average incumbents is driven by different 
factors across countries.  
o In Canada and especially the United States the small relative size of entrant it reflects 
both the large size of incumbents (see above) and the small average size of entrants 
compared to that in most other countries (in the United States, about 2.5 employees in the 
total economy and about 5 in manufacturing). In other words, entrant firms are further 
away from the efficient size in the United States than in most other countries for which 
data are available. There are a number of different possible explanations for this. First, 
the larger market of the United States may partly explain the larger average size of 
incumbents.14 Second, the wider gap between entry size and the minimum efficient size 
in the United States may reflect economic and institutional factors, e.g. the relatively low 
entry and exit costs may increase incentives to start up relatively small businesses. We 
will return to this issue later. 
o In the transition economies, new firms are substantially different from most of the 
existing firms that were drawn from the centrally-planned period. Indeed the net entry of 
firms (entry rate minus exit rate) is particularly large amongst micro units (20 or fewer 
                                                          
14 . Geographical considerations may also affect the average size of firms: firms with plants 
spreading into different US states are recorded as single units, while establishments belonging to 
the same firm but located in different EU states are recorded as separate units. 
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employees): during the centrally planned system there were relatively few of these micro 
firms which however exploded during the transition in most of business service activities.   
 Turnover rates vary significantly across sectors in each country.  Table 5 presents the 
sectoral gross turnover rates (entry plus exit rates weighted by employment) normalized by the 
overall cross-country average.  As before, if technological factors were predominant in 
determining the heterogeneity of firm dynamics across countries, we should find that the values 
in the country columns of  Table 5 are  concentrated around one.  The first element to report is 
that the variability of turnover rates for the same industry across countries is comparable in 
magnitude to that across industry in each country.15 Turnover rates (especially if weighted by 
employment) are somewhat higher in the service sector (especially in trade) than in 
manufacturing.16 However, in most countries, some high-tech industries with rapid technological 
changes and market experimentation had relatively high entry rates in the 1990s (e.g. office, 
computing and equipments and radio, TV and communication).  Transition, but also emerging 
economies in Latin America tend to have greater firm churning than in the industrial countries, on 
average.  This result is dominated by some sector dominated by few firms (e.g. fuel and 
petroleum) as well as some traditional activity (e.g. construction) but also some high-tech 
industry exposed to intense competition and FDI (e.g. radio, TV and communication).  
 It is also interesting to compare entry and exit rates across sectors to test two competing 
theories: one hypothesis is that entry and exit rates at the sectoral level are mostly driven by 
sectoral shocks.  Sectors with positive profit shocks will have high entry and sectors with 
negative profit shocks will have high exit.  If sectoral profit shocks are the predominant source of 
variation, then the cross-sectional correlation between entry and exit rates should be negative.  
Alternatively, entry and exit rates at the sectoral level might be driven by the within sector 
creative destruction process.  A sector with a high dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks and/or low 
barriers to entry and exit will exhibit both high entry and high exit rates.  If the creative 
destruction process is the predominant factor driving entry and exit, then the cross-sectional 
correlation of entry and exit should be positive.  
 In most of the industrial countries annual entry and exit rates are generally positively 
correlated across industries (Table 6), confirming previous evidence (e.g. Geroski, 1991a; 
Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991).  And the correlations are particularly strong when the entry and exit 
rates are weighted by employment. The table also presents the correlations between the average 
entry and exit rates over the 1990s which account for the possibility that industry changes in entry 
and exit do not occur in the same year.  Indeed, the correlations based on the average over the 
                                                          
15. Two sectors stand out as clear outliers: agriculture, where some countries have very high 
turnover rates in absolute and relative terms; and electricity, gas and water, where turnover is 
very low in some countries. This latter result is perhaps not surprising given that this industry is 
often dominated by public utilities.  
16 . In Italy and especially Finland, however, there appears to be only small differences in churning 
between manufacturing and services. In the case of Italy this is particularly evident for the 
employment-weighted turnover and likely reflects the small differences in average size of firms 
between manufacturing and services. For Finland, the high turnover in manufacturing is likely 
the result of major restructuring, which took place in the aftermath of the deep recession of the 
early 1990s. The lower turnover rate in the French service sector compared with that in 
manufacturing is likely to depend on the existence of a size threshold in the French data, which 
tends to be more binding in the service sector than in manufacturing. As an indication, the 
French data also suggest a higher average size of firms in the service sector than in 
manufacturing, in contrast with all other countries.  
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decade tend to be even stronger.  Perhaps not surprisingly, entry and exit rates are loosely or even 
negatively correlated in some of the transition economies where traditional manufacturing sectors 
are losing ground while new service sectors are expanding and in some emerging economies 
(Colombia and Venezuela) where, again, rapid structural changes have occurred in the period 
observed by the data. 
 These finding suggests that entries and exits are largely part of a creative destruction 
process in which entry and exit reflects within sector reallocation reflecting idiosyncratic 
differences across firms within sectors.17  Taken at face value, there are a few countries with 
negative correlations which might reflect a greater role for sectoral profitability shocks in those 
countries (and/or might reflect measurement error).   
Table 5.   Gross firm turnover across countries and sectors (employment-weighted flows)  
(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-
country 
average Industrial
Other 
countries Denmark France Italy Netherlands Finland
West 
Germany Portugal UK USA
total economy 8.1 0.95 1.08 1.26 0.86 1.06 1.24 1.47 0.48 1.15 0.86
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry And Fishing 9.4 1.09 0.87 1.45 1.13 0.96 0.75 0.99 1.63 1.24
Mining And Quarrying 7.1 0.87 1.21 0.80 1.48 1.40 0.47 1.78 0.13 0.98 0.80
Total Manufacturing 7.1 1.00 1.00 1.19 1.45 1.20 1.17 1.67 0.35 1.10 1.58 0.50
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 6.8 1.08 0.90 1.63 2.21 1.47 1.41 1.34 0.48 1.68 0.34
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 8.3 1.02 0.97 1.37 1.34 1.23 1.47 1.30 0.41 1.14 1.47 0.85
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 9.1 0.92 1.09 1.02 1.14 0.81 0.97 1.18 0.28 1.26 1.63 0.95
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 7.6 1.02 0.98 1.03 1.25 0.87 1.14 2.40 0.32 0.99 1.46 0.51
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 9.5 0.48 1.48 1.74 1.55 0.10 0.44 0.12
Chemicals And Chemical Products 4.3 1.13 0.87 0.96 1.98 1.61 1.69 1.98 0.49 1.24 0.41
Rubber And Plastics Products 6.3 0.96 1.04 1.06 1.36 0.99 1.52 1.55 0.40 1.31 0.65
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 6.4 1.08 0.91 1.24 1.34 1.18 1.39 1.98 0.35 1.07 1.67 0.69
Basic Metals 6.2 1.08 0.93 1.52 2.28 0.12 1.25 1.58 1.16 0.56
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 8.1 0.99 1.01 1.00 1.07 1.42 1.11 1.44 0.59
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 7.8 0.87 1.13 0.74 0.96 0.91 0.84 1.29 1.37 0.45
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 12.5 0.93 1.07 1.13 1.12 1.36 3.96 1.52 0.18
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 6.8 1.12 0.88 1.21 1.25 1.21 2.26 0.68 1.60 0.42
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 9.0 0.88 1.13 1.11 0.98 0.31 1.08 1.37 1.40 0.43
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 6.4 1.17 0.85 1.39 1.18 1.14 1.42 0.52 2.18 0.35
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 5.2 0.93 1.06 1.09 0.73 2.68 1.65 0.49 1.22 0.25
Other Transport Equipment 9.7 1.01 0.99 0.77 1.21 1.59 1.84 1.50 1.37 0.11
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 9.0 0.90 1.10 1.02 1.51 1.00 0.69 1.16 0.40 0.79 1.53 0.72
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 5.7 1.04 0.94 0.18 1.72 5.16 2.96 1.23 0.13 0.02 0.14
Construction 11.7 0.87 1.19 1.07 0.96 1.02 0.63 1.26 0.44 0.94 1.03
Services 9.1 0.95 1.06 1.16 0.68 0.80 1.19 1.40 1.10 0.83
Market Services 9.6 0.96 1.05 1.17 0.64 0.94 1.10 1.27 1.06 0.95
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 10.5 0.91 1.11 1.05 0.78 0.98 0.78 1.07 1.06 0.89
Transport And Storage And Communication 7.8 1.07 0.89 0.99 1.07 0.76 1.05 1.79 0.65 2.27 0.72
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 9.6 0.96 1.05 1.35 0.51 0.87 1.54 1.30 0.72 1.05
Community Social And Personal Services 8.7 0.77 1.24 1.00 0.73 0.60 1.29 1.07 0.53
 
                                                          
17. Dunne et al. (1988) suggest that entry and exit rates are correlated with a lag in the United 
States. However, even then the entry rate in a given five-year period is positively correlated with 
exit rates in the following five years. For an extensive discussion on this issue see Caves (1998). 
Caves also signals that the correlation between entry and exit reverts to negative in early and late 
phases of products' life cycle, 
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(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-
country 
average Chile Colombia Mexico Slovenia Hungary Estonia Brazil Latvia Romania Argentina
total economy 8.1 1.16 1.08 1.16 1.16 0.91 0.99 1.00
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry And Fishing 9.4 0.79 1.05 0.72 1.20 0.73 0.93
Mining And Quarrying 7.1 1.04 1.44 0.77 2.37 0.92 1.45 0.89
Total Manufacturing 7.1 1.01 0.77 0.97 1.14 1.23 1.13 1.30 1.01 0.87 0.84
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 6.8 1.08 0.68 0.85 0.48 1.41 0.95 1.57 0.86 0.89
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 8.3 0.80 0.85 1.30 0.70 1.25 0.83 1.44 0.83 0.90
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 9.1 1.33 1.00 1.24 0.84 1.29 0.96 1.37 0.79 0.89
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 7.6 0.82 0.66 1.01 1.24 1.18 0.84 1.33 1.16 0.99 0.81
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 9.5 0.74 0.27 1.00 6.60 0.02 8.08 0.37 4.58 0.91 0.11
Chemicals And Chemical Products 4.3 1.51 0.80 0.80 0.38 0.48 1.17 1.26 0.97 0.81 0.79
Rubber And Plastics Products 6.3 1.16 0.77 1.07 1.00 1.64 0.94 1.35 1.44 0.32 0.85
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 6.4 0.95 0.69 1.02 0.85 1.51 0.88 1.23 1.16 0.30 0.66
Basic Metals 6.2 0.69 0.46 0.73 1.56 1.72 0.98 0.71 1.57 0.35 0.76
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 8.1 0.85 0.63 1.20 1.31 1.50 0.72 1.16 1.16 0.52 0.91
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 7.8 0.77 0.90 2.15 1.12 0.75 0.94 1.15 1.04 0.86
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 12.5 5.37 0.26 0.31 0.88 0.23 0.60 2.11 0.53 1.31
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 6.8 0.62 0.85 0.62 0.73 2.95 0.68 1.24 0.55 0.81
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 9.0 4.16 0.52 1.03 0.86 0.73 0.65 0.42 0.26 0.40
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 6.4 0.69 1.13 0.66 1.00 0.88 1.21 1.07 0.41 0.87
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 5.2 0.99 0.81 0.57 2.33 0.82 0.56 1.58 1.53 0.83 0.73
Other Transport Equipment 9.7 1.94 0.73 0.69 1.74 1.02 0.23 0.59 0.86 0.18 0.87
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 9.0 0.74 1.10 1.19 1.33 1.34 0.97 1.16 0.84 1.15 1.21
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 5.7 0.28 0.57 0.70 0.76 1.27 2.92 0.64
Construction 11.7 2.31 0.72 1.11 0.88 0.60 0.46 1.27
Services 9.1 1.08 1.10 1.16 1.10 0.82 1.19 0.90
Market Services 9.6 1.18 0.99 1.08 1.04 0.76 1.10 1.04
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 10.5 1.20 0.97 1.37 1.00 0.71 1.27 1.11
Transport And Storage And Communication 7.8 1.11 0.96 0.43 0.88 0.78 0.91 0.98
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 9.6 1.01 1.09 1.28 1.45 0.85 0.92 0.93
Community Social And Personal Services 8.7 0.61 1.99 1.54 1.18 1.00 1.72 0.62
 
 
Table 6. Correlation between entry and exit rates across industries, 1990s   
Observations =
industry*year
Entry/Exit
Correlation
Entry/Exit
Correlation
(Weighted)
Observations =
industry
Entry/Exit
Correlation
Entry/Exit
Correlation
(Weighted)
Denmark 85 0.3731* 0.6687* 17 0.5681* 0.8739*
France 132 -0.2449* -0.1025 22 -0.5250* -0.2986
Italy 125 0.0976 0.7999* 25 0.1011 0.6894*
Netherlands 175 0.3131* 25 0.6702*
Finland 175  0.2717* 0.4084* 23 0.2675 0.2413
West Germany 130 0.6880* 0.6242* 13 0.7510* 0.7702*
East Germany 56 0.0385 0.5599* 14 0.1855 0.7181*
Portugal 124 -0.1239  0.5671* 25 0.3526 0.0331
UK 105  0.2845*  0.6412* 15 0.4709 0.7389*
USA 199  0.8801*   0.8167* 25  0.8132*  0.9513*
Canada 168 0.5782* 0.7683* 21 0.8252* 0.9301*
Venezuela 16 -0.3306 -0.1726
Chile 128 0.6323* 0.5504* 18 0.0947 0.3741
Colombia 129 0.0319 0.1595 18 0.4385 0.5527*
Brazil 38 0.3472* 0.5068* 19 0.395 0.7880*
Mexico 220 0.1882* 0.5441* 20 0.7756* 0.9159*
Argentina 100 0.0582 0.4971* 25 0.3973* 0.7432*
Slovenia 178 -0.05 0.7680* 25 -0.1602 0.4373*
Hungary 145 0.2445* 0.5651* 25 0.1917 0.7793*
Estonia 59 0.4977* 0.2874* 24 0.3344 0.4621*
Latvia 98 -0.0609 0.1511 24 0.294 0.1772
Romania 119 0.0826 0.1209 21 0.6098* 0.4066
Correlations are based on a maximum of 25 industries in the business sector.
* = Significant at 10% level.
Annual correlations Correlations on time averages
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The post-entry performance of firms 
 The evidence provided in the previous section clearly indicates that firm dynamics (the 
entry and exit of firms) is not necessarily associated with changes in the size of the population of 
firms or in the number of products in the market but rather with continuous changes in the 
characteristics of firms in each market. In this context, what happens to firms subsequent to their 
entry seems at least as important as the entry process itself.  Understanding the post-entry 
performance sheds light on the market selection process that separates successful entrant firms 
that survive and prosper from others that stagnate and eventually exit.  We examine the post-entry 
performance of firms sequentially: we start by presenting simple survivor functions across 
countries and main sectors and then move to non-parametric and semi-parametric analyses of 
survival.   
 Figure 4 presents non-parametric (graphic) estimates of survivor rates for firms that 
entered the market in the late 1980s and1990s. The survivor rate  specifies the proportion of firms 
from a cohort of entrants that still exist at a given age  In the figure, the survival rates are 
averaged over different entry cohorts and do not take into account differences in the industry 
composition across countries. 
Figure 4.  Firm survival at different lifetimes, 1990s  
Panel A: Manufacturing 
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Panel B:  Total business sector 
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 Looking at cross-country differences in survivor rates, about 10 per cent (Slovenia) to 
more than 30 per cent (in Mexico) of entering firms fail within the first two years (Figure 4). 
Conditional on overcoming the initial years, the prospect of firms improves in the subsequent 
period: firms that remain in the business after the first two years have a 40 to 80 per cent chance 
of surviving for five more years. Nevertheless, only about 30-50 percent of total entering firms in 
a given year survive beyond the seventh year in industrial and Latin American countries, while 
higher survival rates are found in transition economies.  
 For most countries, the rank ordering of survival is similar whether using a 2-year, 
4-year or 7-year horizon suggesting that there is an important country effect that impacts the 
survival function.  However, there are a few interesting exceptions.  The U.S. has relatively low 
survival rates at the 2-year horizon but relatively higher survival rates at the 7-year horizon.  This 
pattern might reflect the relatively rapid cleansing of poorly performing firms in the U.S.  In the 
next section, we explore the productivity implications of the turnover patterns that we observe 
across countries and industries. 
 Table 7 provides details on the survival rates at age four across industries and countries.  
The structure of the Table is similar to that in Table 4 above: the first column presents the 
cross-country average survival rate for each industry; the second and third columns report the 
deviations from this average for industrial and other countries respectively; while the other 
columns present the deviations for each country individually. Notably, the variation across 
countries is more systematic than that across industries.  Across industries, after four years 
between 60 and 80 percent of firms survive, while for example the survival rate in office and 
computing equipment deviates from 40 percent below to 40 percent above the cross-country 
average of 70 percent. We will return to this in the parametric analysis of survival. 
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Table 7.  Survival rate (4 years of age) across countries and industries  
(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-
country 
average Industrial
Other 
countries Finland France UK
West 
Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal USA
Mining And Quarrying 0.69 1.05 0.94 1.07 0.91  1.14 1.10 1.15 1.11 0.85
Total Manufacturing 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.02 0.79 1.10 1.04 1.07 1.12 0.95
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 0.69 1.02 0.98 0.92 1.10 0.69 1.10 1.08 1.01 1.35 0.91
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 0.59 0.96 1.03 0.95 0.98 0.75 0.99 1.04 1.02 1.14 0.81
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 0.64 1.04 0.97 0.95 1.10 0.86 1.12 1.09 1.19 1.04 0.99
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 0.69 0.98 1.01 0.97 0.92 0.82 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.13 0.94
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 0.73 1.05 0.96 1.05 1.05 0.67 1.20 1.23 1.13 1.37 0.79
Chemicals And Chemical Products 0.69 1.02 0.99 0.89 0.96 0.88 1.09 1.11 1.04 1.14 1.01
Rubber And Plastics Products 0.73 0.98 1.01 0.91 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.06 0.90
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.68 1.02 0.98 0.96 1.08 0.76 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.16 0.97
Basic Metals 0.69 0.99 1.01 0.94  0.85  1.08 1.15 1.01 0.93
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 0.69 1.01 0.99 0.95  0.90  1.05 1.08 1.12 1.00
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 0.73 1.01 0.99 0.96 1.03 0.70  1.00 1.09 1.29 0.99
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 0.70 0.88 1.10 0.92  0.61  1.05 1.03 1.13 0.80
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 0.74 0.93 1.06 0.90 1.01 0.71  1.00 1.00 0.99 0.91
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 0.71 0.92 1.08 0.99 0.86 0.73  1.00 0.91 1.00 0.95
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 0.77 0.96 1.04 1.03 0.88 0.70  0.92 1.08 1.15 0.95
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 0.70 0.99 1.01 0.87 1.03 0.72  1.08 1.05 1.29 0.92
Other Transport Equipment 0.65 0.98 1.01 0.78 1.00 0.77  1.05 1.14 1.25 0.95
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 0.66 1.02 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.78 1.14 1.04 1.11 1.29 0.92
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 0.82 1.01 0.99 1.14 0.98  1.01 1.00 0.99 1.01 0.95
Construction 0.64 1.07 0.94 1.00 1.00  1.10 1.03 1.18 1.18 0.98
Market Services 0.66 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.96  1.01 1.02 1.14 1.09 0.96
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 0.64 1.02 0.98 0.91 1.01  1.02 1.03 1.07 1.12 0.96
Transport And Storage And Communication 0.66 0.98 1.02 1.22 1.05  1.00 1.04 1.07 0.45 0.94
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 0.70 1.01 0.99 1.01 0.85  1.00 1.01 1.16 1.10 0.95
Total non-agricultural business sector 0.65 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.82 1.05 1.04 1.16 1.13 0.97
 
(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-
country 
average Industrial
Other 
countries Estonia Hungary Latvia Romania Slovenia Argentina Chile Colombia Mexico
Mining And Quarrying 0.69 1.05 0.94 0.49 1.11 0.98  1.40 0.84   0.69
Total Manufacturing 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.11 1.09 1.22 0.89 1.04 0.87 0.76
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 0.69 1.02 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.09  1.15 0.86 1.03 0.95 0.80
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 0.59 0.96 1.03 1.19 1.21 1.30  1.20 0.91 1.08 0.87 0.80
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 0.64 1.04 0.97 1.01 1.08 1.04  1.26 0.83 1.13 0.77 0.69
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 0.69 0.98 1.01 0.95 1.04 1.08 1.06 1.23 0.93 1.09 1.02 0.77
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 0.73 1.05 0.96  0.97 1.14 1.37 1.37 0.83 0.93 1.11 0.92
Chemicals And Chemical Products 0.69 1.02 0.99 0.95 1.04 1.07 1.09 0.95 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.86
Rubber And Plastics Products 0.73 0.98 1.01 1.14 1.10 1.12 1.05 1.20 0.94 1.02 0.90 0.81
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.68 1.02 0.98 1.11 1.04 1.17 1.09 1.22 0.89 0.98 0.83 0.74
Basic Metals 0.69 0.99 1.01  0.97 1.35 1.03 1.32 0.90 1.13 0.92 0.78
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 0.69 1.01 0.99 1.12 1.12 1.21 1.09 1.27 0.85 1.00 0.82 0.70
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 0.73 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.09 0.96 1.03 1.20 0.86 0.97 0.75  
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 0.70 0.88 1.10 1.42 1.16 1.10 1.02 1.22 0.60 1.42 1.42  
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 0.74 0.93 1.06 1.02 1.06 1.05 1.10 1.13 0.93 1.14 0.98  
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 0.71 0.92 1.08 0.95 1.07 1.27 1.07 1.22 0.86 1.06 1.04  
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 0.77 0.96 1.04 1.30 1.07 1.15 1.01 1.12 0.99 1.04 0.81  
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 0.70 0.99 1.01 1.07 1.14 1.43 1.14 1.16 0.95 0.96 0.83 0.81
Other Transport Equipment 0.65 0.98 1.01 1.37 1.13 1.43 1.21 1.06 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.76
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 0.66 1.02 0.98 1.05 1.11 1.20 1.11 1.17 0.89 1.07 0.78 0.70
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 0.82 1.01 0.99 0.95 0.98 1.12 1.05 1.06 0.95   0.88
Construction 0.64 1.07 0.94 1.16 1.16 1.21 1.17 1.31 0.66   0.32
Market Services 0.66 1.02 0.98 1.07 1.06 1.12 0.96 1.19 0.89   0.73
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 0.64 1.02 0.98 1.06 1.07 1.13 0.98 1.20 0.87   0.74
Transport And Storage And Communication 0.66 0.98 1.02 1.15 1.11 1.22 1.04 1.14 0.98   0.78
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 0.70 1.01 0.99 1.06 1.06 1.13 1.00 1.20 0.91   0.75
Total non-agricultural business sector 0.65 1.02 0.99 1.09 1.10 1.15 1.00 1.23 0.88 1.07 0.90 0.67
 Each given cohort tends to increase in the initial years because failures are highly 
concentrated amongst its smallest units and because of the significant growth of survivors. These 
facts are best presented by looking at survival rates expressed in terms of total employment of a 
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given cohort and in terms of gains in average firm size amongst surviving firms (Figures 5 and 6). 
The time profile of the survivor function expressed in terms of employment is shifted upward and 
is flatter compared with the survival function of firms, due to the exit of predominantly smaller 
units. On average employment in a given cohort remains in the 80-120 per cent range of its initial 
level after the first two years of its life.   
 Figure 6 shows the evolution in average firm size of survivors as they age, corrected for 
possible changes in entry size of the actual survivors by age. In the Figure the average size of 
survivors at different duration is compared with that at entry.18  The difference in post-entry 
behavior of firms in the United States19 compared with the West European countries is partially 
due to the larger gap between the size at entry and the average firm size of incumbents, i.e. there 
is a greater scope for expansion amongst young ventures in the US markets than in Europe. In 
turn, the smaller relative size of entrants, can be taken to indicate a greater degree of 
experimentation, with firms starting small and, if successful, expanding rapidly to approach the 
minimum efficient scale.20 
 Latin American countries also offer a wide range of post-entry performance of firms.  
Argentina has very limited post-entry expansion of successful firms in manufacturing, while in 
Mexico selection of small firms is stronger than in all other countries,  but post-entry growth of 
successful firms is also very strong, pointing to a strong market selection process but also strong 
rewards to successful new firms.   
                                                          
18. Given differences in data collection, the reference average size of entrants is that at duration one 
for industrial countries and duration zero for other countries, but excluding firms with zero 
employment.  The choice for the industrial countries is dictated by the fact that entrant firms 
include zero-employee firms.  This, however, may represent an over-correction as it eliminates 
employment growth in firms with positive employment at registration. Earlier estimates 
(Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi, 2003) which did not make this correction show larger 
increase in surviving firms in some countries (e.g. the United States).  In the United States, the 
time when the firm is registered and when its employment is recorded differ giving rise to the 
possibility that firms are recorded as having zero employees in the entry year and positive 
employment in the second year. However, recent work by Jarmin (2003), shows that even after 
correcting for the zero-employee problem, the size expansion of entrant firms in the U.S. 
exceeds that in other industrial countries by a wide margin.  The growth in firm size in the 
ensuing years shows that the United States continues to perform much better than other OECD 
countries.  
19.  The results for the United States are consistent with the evidence in Audretsch (1995). He found 
that the four-year employment growth amongst surviving firms was about 90 per cent. 
20. This greater experimentation of small firms in the US market may also contribute to explain the 
evidence of a lower than average productivity at entry, as discussed below. 
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Figure 5  Employment-based survival rates at different lifetimes, Total employment,  1990s 
Panel A: Manufacturing 
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Panel B:  Total Business sector 
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 Transition economies show a different behavior from most other countries also on firm 
survival.  They tend to show higher survivor rates and large post entry growth of successful firms 
which confirm the hypothesis that new firms enjoyed a period of relatively low market 
contestability especially in new low populated markets.    Romania is obviously an outlier 
amongst transition economies: not only are failure rates higher than in the other countries, but 
even successful entrants have more limited opportunities of expanding. 
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Figure 6.  Average firm size relative to entry, by age  
Panel A: Manufacturing 
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Panel B:  Total Business sector 
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 Table 8 presents the post entry growth of entrant cohorts at age seven across countries 
and industries. As in the previous tables, the first column shows the cross-country average for 
each industry, and the value for each industry and country relative to the industry average.  In 
high tech manufacturing industries (ICT, radio and TV) and some service industries 
(communication and finance), successful firms have high post entry employment, while 
traditional manufacturing industries show only moderate size increases.        
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 Table 8.  Post entry (employment) growth (at 7 years of age) across countries and 
industries 
(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-
country 
average Industrial
Other 
countries Finland France UK
West 
Germany Italy Portugal USA
Mining And Quarrying 43.9 0.1 1.6  0.6  1.0  0.3  
Total Manufacturing 34.9 0.8 1.4 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.3 1.0 0.7 1.8
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 30.6 0.5 1.5  0.0 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 38.1 0.4 1.8   1.4  0.8 0.7 1.1
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 28.2 0.8 1.4 0.4 1.3 1.3 0.8 1.6 0.3 0.2
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 35.8 0.7 1.4  0.2 1.2 1.0  0.9 2.0
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 70.6 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.1   1.6  6.0
Chemicals And Chemical Products 68.7 0.7 1.1 1.7 0.4  0.2 1.3 0.2 0.4
Rubber And Plastics Products 59.3 0.6 1.4 0.2 0.5  0.4 1.0 0.5 1.2
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 30.0 0.9 1.2  0.9 1.0 0.9 1.6 1.3 1.0
Basic Metals 36.7 0.6 1.4 0.3  0.6   0.9 2.0
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 38.4 1.2 0.9 1.6  0.7  1.4 0.3 2.2
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 37.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.5  1.1 1.1 1.7
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 93.1 0.8 1.3 0.4  0.8  1.0 0.8 0.9
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 73.7 1.1 1.0 2.4 0.2 0.5  0.7 2.1 0.8
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 93.4 0.6 1.4 0.5 0.3 0.6  0.1 0.8 1.5
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 66.1 0.7 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.3  0.9  0.9
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 77.5 0.9 1.4 1.8 0.1 0.7  0.4 0.8 1.4
Other Transport Equipment 34.0 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.8   1.4  6.4
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 46.3 0.8 1.1 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.6
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 19.1 1.5 0.8  2.6  2.0 0.1 7.2  
Construction 32.5 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.4  1.0 0.8 0.6 1.0
Market Services 49.1 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.5  0.7 0.8 1.1 0.9
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 44.9 0.6 1.4 0.1 0.5  0.5 1.0 0.9 0.3
Transport And Storage And Communication 57.5 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.6  0.6 0.4 4.2 1.0
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 67.4 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4  0.7 0.6 1.2 1.5
Total non-agricultural business sector 36.3 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.1
(as a ratio to cross-country sectoral average)
cross-
country 
average Industrial
Other 
countries Hungary Romania Slovenia Argentina Chile Colombia Mexico
Mining And Quarrying 43.9 0.1 1.6   5.1 4.2   1.2
Total Manufacturing 34.9 0.8 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 1.1 3.9
Food Products, Beverages And Tobacco 30.6 0.5 1.5 0.7  2.0 2.2 0.9 1.1 2.8
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather And Footwear 38.1 0.4 1.8 1.2  2.2 0.9 0.3 1.3 4.1
Wood And Products Of Wood And Cork 28.2 0.8 1.4 1.8  0.9 0.1 0.9 0.3 3.1
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 35.8 0.7 1.4 0.4 0.7 2.5 0.4 0.6 1.9 2.6
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 70.6 1.6 0.5    1.1 0.5 2.5 0.9
Chemicals And Chemical Products 68.7 0.7 1.1 0.4 1.6 1.8 2.4 0.6 0.6 1.6
Rubber And Plastics Products 59.3 0.6 1.4 1.3 1.9 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 2.9
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 30.0 0.9 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.6 1.3 2.9
Basic Metals 36.7 0.6 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.0 0.4 4.2
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery And Equipment 38.4 1.2 0.9 1.4  1.1 0.4 0.8 0.3 2.0
Machinery And Equipment, N.E.C. 37.2 1.0 1.0 1.9 0.6 1.3 1.0 0.3 0.8  
Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 93.1 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.3 1.1 0.8  0.1  
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus, Nec 73.7 1.1 1.0 2.4 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.1  
Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 93.4 0.6 1.4 3.0 0.3 3.1 1.4 1.0   
Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments 66.1 0.7 1.5 0.4 2.9 2.0 0.6 1.7 0.5  
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi-Trailers 77.5 0.9 1.4 2.4 1.1 0.5  0.8 0.4 3.2
Other Transport Equipment 34.0 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.9    2.7 3.0
Manufacturing Nec; Recycling 46.3 0.8 1.1 1.6 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.8 0.2 2.9
Electricity, Gas And Water Supply 19.1 1.5 0.8   1.6    3.8
Construction 32.5 0.8 1.1 0.2  1.8 1.6   2.6
Market Services 49.1 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.8   1.3
Wholesale And Retail Trade; Restaurants And Hotels 44.9 0.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.9   1.2
Transport And Storage And Communication 57.5 1.2 0.7  0.6 0.7 0.9   1.4
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate And Business Services 67.4 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.6 1.8   1.4
Total non-agricultural business sector 36.3 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.6 0.5 1.1 2.4
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Controlling for sectoral composition and right-censoring 
 
 The survival analysis discussed so far suffers from two problems: i) as in the case of firm 
size and firm turnover, differences in sectoral composition are likely to influence the observed 
cross-country differences in survival rates; and ii) right censoring makes comparisons 
problematic especially for countries for which we have short longitudinal series. In order to 
compare survival and exit hazards across countries and sectors, and to cope with the right-
censoring and other problems in the data (in some countries, non-monotonic survival rates), we 
complement non-parametric counts with a statistical survival analysis. The survival distribution 
function (SDF) is used to describe the lifespan of the population of interest. The SDF evaluated at 
t is the probability that an experimental unit from the population will have a lifetime, T, of at least 
t, that is: 
( tTtS ≥= Pr)( )          [2] 
where S(t) denotes the survival function and T is the lifetime of a randomly selected experimental 
unit.  
 Some functions closely related to the SDF are the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF), the probability density function (PDF) and the hazard function (HF). These are defined as: 
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 We have used the Cox’ proportional hazard model to study firm survival.  This model 
assumes a p parametric form of the effects of the explanatory variables on syurvival, but it allows 
an unspecified form for the underlying survival function. The survival time of each member of a 
population is assumed to follow its own hazard function: 
βiz
ii ethzthth
'
0 )();()( ==         [4] 
with h0(t) an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function, zi the vector of measured 
explanatory variables for the ith individual and β the vector of unknown regressions parameters 
associated with the explanatory variables (this vector is assumed to be the same for all 
individuals). 
 The survival function can be expressed as: 
functionsurvivalbaselinetheetS
etSztS
t
i
duuh
z
i
∫=
=
−
0
0 )(
0
'
0
)(
)();( β
     [5] 
β is estimated using the partial likelihood function, which eliminates the unknown baseline hazard 
h0(t) and accounts for censored survival times.  
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 The population under study may consist of a number of subpopulations, each of which 
has its own baseline hazard function. To adjust for such subpopulation differences a stratified 
analysis can be performed. Under the stratified model, the hazard function for the jth individual in 
the ith stratum is expressed as: 
βijz
iij ethth
'
0 )()( =          [6] 
with hi0(t) the baseline hazard function for the ith stratum, zij the vector of measured explanatory 
variables for the jth individual, and β the vector of unknown regressions parameters associated 
with the explanatory variables (this vector is assumed to be the same for all individuals). 
The hazard ratios, computed by calculating the exponential of the parameter coefficients, 
are useful in interpreting the results of the analysis. If the hazard ratio of a prognostic factor is 
larger than 1, an increment in the factor increases the hazard rate. If the hazard ratio is less than 1, 
an increment in the factor decreases the hazard rate. 
 One of the main assumptions of the Cox proportional hazard model is proportionality. 
We checked for this by including time-dependent covariates in the model (interactions of the 
variables with age). If a time-dependent covariate is significant this indicates a violation of the 
proportionality assumption for that variable. If one of the variables is not proportional there are 
various solutions to consider: (1) change from using a semi-parametric Cox regression model to 
using a parametric regression model; (2) include the time-dependent variable for the non-
proportional variables; (3) use a model, which stratifies on the non-proportional variables. The 
last option assumes that we are fitting separate models for each stratum under the constraint that 
the coefficients are equal, but the baseline hazard functions are not equal. 
 The explanatory variables included in the model are: (1) dummies for country; (2) 
dummies for industry (the lowest level available). The tests of all the time-dependent variables 
were not significant either individually or collectively so we do not have enough evidence to 
reject proportionality and will assume that we have satisfied the assumption of proportionality for 
this model. 
By aggregating the survival probabilities over the industries, the survival function for 
each country can be computed: these are shown in figure 7 below:  
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Figure 7.  Semi-parametric survivor function by duration, 1990s 
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 Controlling for industry composition and for right-censoring reduces the country 
differences in survivor rates.  Amongst industrial countries, the United Kingdom shows lower 
survivor rates, while Netherlands and Portugal show the highest survivor rates.  In Latin America, 
Mexico stands as the country with the lowest survivor rate, while both Colombia and Chile have 
higher rates.  The survivor rates in transition countries seem to be shifted up-ward but Romania 
stands with relatively low rates compared with other countries in the group.  
 Another pattern of interest reflects countries with more convex survival functions so 
that exit rates are especially high for young businesses but decrease for older businesses so that 
the rank ordering of the country in terms of survival rates changes over the horizon.  Countries 
that exhibit more convex survival functions include the U.S., Hungary and Argentina.  Without 
more analysis, it is difficult to interpret these patterns as reflecting a more efficient “cleansing 
process” for poorly performing entrants.  The analysis in the next section takes us in the direction 
of such analysis. 
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5. The effects of creative destruction on productivity 
Reallocation and Productivity:  Growth vs. Level Comparisons     
 In the previous two sections we have presented evidence of significant cross-country 
differences in firm characteristics, their market dynamics and post-entry performance which 
cannot be fully explained by differences in sectoral composition of the economy but rather points 
to salient differences in market characteristics and in business environment.  The next obvious 
question is: do these differences matter for aggregate performance?   We address this question in 
a number of ways.  First, we examine the connection between productivity growth and the 
reallocation dynamics that we have documented in the prior sections.  We are particularly 
interested in the contribution of entering and exiting businesses as well as the contribution of the 
reallocation of activity amongst continuing businesses.  However, such analysis of the 
contribution of reallocation to productivity growth across countries, while inherently interesting, 
is fraught with interpretational difficulties given our discussion in section 2 and also potentially 
problematic due to measurement difficulties given our discussion in section 3.  We attempt to 
overcome some aspects of these difficulties by exploiting sectoral variation within countries in 
this analysis and then in turn comparing such sectoral differences between countries (i.e., a 
difference-in-difference approach).  In addition, we explore a cross sectional decomposition of 
productivity that turns out to be simpler and more robust in terms of theoretical predictions and 
measurement.   
Reallocation and Productivity Growth    
 Using as building blocks productivity at the firm level, as well as the inputs used in 
production, productivity for each industry can be decomposed into the contribution of continuing 
firms, entrants and exiting firms21  
 Let’s define the sector-wide productivity level in year t, Pt as:  
Pt ii= ∑ θ pt it
                                                          
         [7] 
where θi is the employment share of firm i and Pt and pit are a productivity measure (in this 
analysis, labor productivity).   
 We have used three different methods for the decomposition of productivity growth.  
The first by Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (FHK henceforth, 2001)22 decomposes aggregate 
productivity growth into five components, commonly called the ‘within effect’, ‘between effect’, 
‘cross effect’, ‘entry effect’, and ‘exit effect’, as follows:  
21.  Besides the industry decompositions of productivity, data also are collected on aggregate 
industry productivity levels and growth rates, un-weighted average productivity of continuing 
firms, entrants and exiters, and on the standard deviation of the distribution of productivity of 
continuers, entrants and exiters. 
22. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) also use this equation but date the exiters productivity in t; this is 
an unfortunate typographical error. 
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where ∆ means changes over the k-years’ interval between the first year (t − k) and the last year 
(t); θit is as before; C, N, and X are sets of continuing, entering, and exiting firms, respectively; 
and Pt-k is the aggregate (i.e., weighted average) productivity level of the sector as of the first year 
(t − k).23  
The components of the FHK decomposition are defined as follows:  
• The within-firm effect is within-firm productivity growth weighted by initial output shares.  
• The between-firm effect captures the gains in aggregate productivity coming from the 
expanding market of high productivity firms, or from low-productivity firms’ shrinking 
shares weighted by initial shares.  
• The ‘cross effect’ reflects gains in productivity from high-productivity growth firms’ 
expanding shares or from low-productivity growth firms’ shrinking shares.  
• The entry effect is the sum of the differences between each entering firm’s productivity and 
initial productivity in the industry, weighted by its market share.   
• The exit effect is the sum of the differences between each exiting firm’s productivity and 
initial productivity in the industry, weighted by its market share. 
 The FHK method uses the first year’s values for a continuing firm’s share (θit-k), its 
productivity level (pit-k) and the sector-wide average productivity level (Pt-k).  One potential 
problem with this method is that, in the presence of measurement error in assessing market shares 
and relative productivity levels in the base year, the correlation between changes in productivity 
and changes in market share could be spurious, affecting the within- and between-firm effects.  
 To tackle these potential problems, we have also used a second approach proposed by 
Griliches and Regev (GR henceforth, 1995) which uses the time averages of the first and last 
years for them ( iθ , ip , and P ). As a result the ‘cross-effect’, or ‘covariance’ term, disappears 
from the decomposition.24 The averaging of market shares in the GR method reduces the 
influence of possible measurement errors, but the interpretation of the different terms of the 
decomposition is less clear-cut as the time averaging makes the within effect term affected by 
changes in the firms' shares over time and the between effect term affected by changes in 
productivity over time.  
                                                          
23. The shares are usually based on employment in decompositions of labour productivity and on 
output in decompositions of total factor productivity. 
24. Similarly, in case of total factor productivity decomposition using output shares, random 
measurement errors in output could yield a positive covariance between productivity changes 
and share changes, and hence, within effect could be spuriously low. 
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 The third method proposed by Baldwin and Gu (BG henceforth, 2003), uses as a 
reference for the calculations of the relative productivity of the different groups the average 
productivity of exiting firms. With this method, the contribution from exiting firms disappears 
and the entry component is positive if, on average, their productivity is higher than those of firms 
they are supposed to replace, the exiting firms.   
 In our analysis we focus much of our discussion on the FHK method, but also use the 
other two methods for sensitivity analysis and to better qualify some of the key results.  As part of 
sensitivity analysis, we also explore, for a sub-set of countries, productivity decompositions over 
different time horizons.  The baseline analysis is based on 5-year rolling windows for all periods 
and industries for which data are available.  However we also present results for a three-year 
rolling windows and test the hypothesis that the contribution from entry changes with the time 
horizon considered.  As discussed above, if new entrants undergo a significant process of learning 
and selection, moving from three to five years should lead to a stronger effect of entry to overall 
productivity.25  We also focus our discussion on results using labor productivity measured using 
real gross output per worker.  While multi-factor productivity is conceptually preferred, it is also 
much more difficult to measure and the number of countries/sectors for which we have reliable 
measures of the evolution of multi-factor productivity is quite limited. 
 Figure 8 presents the decomposition of labor productivity growth in the total business 
sector and Figure 9 presents the decomposition of labor productivity for the manufacturing over 
the 1990s. Due to data availability the analysis for the total business sector is confined to a few 
countries, while data for manufacturing are available for a larger sample of countries. 
 A number of elements emerge from these decompositions: 
o Productivity growth is largely driven by within-firm performance.  In industrial and 
emerging economies (outside transition) productivity within each firm accounted for the 
bulk of overall labor productivity growth.  This is particularly the case if one focuses on 
the three-year horizon (not reported); over the longer run (i.e. 5-year horizon) reallocation 
and, in particular, the entry component plays a stronger role to promote productivity 
growth.   
o The impact on productivity via the reallocation of output across existing enterprises (the 
“between” effect) varies significantly across countries.  It is generally positive but small.  
This factor should be combined with the covariance (or cross) term, which combined 
changes in productivity with changes in employment shares.  The covariance term is 
negative in most countries, including the transition economies (in Latvia it is particularly 
large in the total business sector).  This implies that firms experiencing an increase in 
productivity were also losing market shares, i.e. their productivity growth was associated 
with restructuring and downsizing rather than expansion.  This negative cross term in a 
related way is potentially associated with adjustment costs of labor.  That is, in any given 
cross section there are some businesses that have recently had a productivity shock but 
due to adjustment costs have not adjusted their labor inputs (at least fully).  For 
businesses with a recent positive shock, the higher productivity will lead to a higher 
desired demand for labor and thus we will see such businesses increase employment but 
                                                          
25.  Evidence for the United States suggests that moving from a five to a ten-year makes the entry 
contribution to aggregate productivity growth stronger (see Baily et al. 1996, 1997; and 
Haltiwanger, 1997). 
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due to diminishing returns (in the presence of any fixed factors at the micro level) a 
decrease in productivity. 
o Finally, the net contribution to overall labor productivity growth of the entry and exit of 
firms (net entry) is generally positive in most countries, accounting for between 20 per 
cent and 50 per cent of total productivity growth.  While the exit effect is always positive, 
i.e. the least productive firms exit the market contributing to raise the productivity 
average of those that survive, the entry contribution tend to be negative in most OECD 
countries and in the non-transition  emerging economies.  In transition economies, in all 
but one country (Hungary over the three-year horizon) the entry of new firms makes a 
positive and often strong contribution to productivity.  For most countries, while the 
contribution of net entry is positive, it is less than proportionate relative to the share of 
employment accounted for by firm turnover.   
 An open question is whether the observed differences across countries are accounted for 
by differences in market institutions and policies or whether they reflect different circumstances 
and/or problems of measurement.  As discussed in section 2 and section 3, drawing such 
inferences from cross country evidence is difficult given that the policy environment may impact 
in a variety of ways and given the measurement problems.  Still, there are some patterns worth 
noting.  In the transition economies in particular, there is a very high rate of firm turnover as a 
share of total employment and entry accounts for a large (but less than proportionate to the share 
of turnover) share of productivity growth.  The large contribution of entry partly reflects the large 
rate of firm turnover but it also reflects by construction a positive gap between entrants and 
incumbents productivity.  In interpreting the latter finding, it is useful to put it in the context of 
the high pace of turnover.  In general, it is difficult to interpret differences across countries in the 
magnitude of the gap between entering and exiting businesses.  For example, it might reflect 
fundamentals driving market selection with new businesses adopting the latest business practices 
(or in transition economies, new businesses adopting market business practices relative to 
incumbents) or it might reflect a very high entry barrier so that only very productive new 
businesses enter.  However, the latter explanation might suggest that firm turnover rates should be 
reduced which does not appear to be the case for the transition economies.  Still, for the transition 
economies the contribution of net entry is far from proportionate suggesting that there is 
substantial churning of businesses via entry and exit that is not productivity enhancing in 
transition economies. 
 It is also interesting to note that the entry of new firms has variable effects on overall 
productivity growth in OECD countries. On the whole, data for European countries show that 
new firms typically make a positive contribution to overall productivity growth, although the 
effect is generally of small magnitude. By contrast, entries make a negative contribution in the 
United States for most industries and a stronger than average contribution tends to come from the 
exit of low productivity firms.   Interpreting these findings without more information is difficult.  
The weak performance of entrants in the U.S. might reflect greater experimentation in the U.S.  
so that for each entering cohort of entrants there is more selection and potentially more learning 
by doing.  Some evidence in favor of this interpretation is provided in Haltiwanger, Jarmin and 
Schank (2003), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001, 2002) and Bartelsman and Scarpetta 
(2004).   The former paper provides evidence of greater market experimentation in the U.S. 
relative to Germany.  The latter shows that in the U.S. that as the horizon lengthens in the U.S., 
the contribution of net entry rises disproportionately.  Moreover, Foster et. al. show that the 
increased contribution of net entry is due to both selection of the low productivity entrants and 
due to learning by doing to successful entrants. 
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Figure 8    Firm-level labor productivity decomposition for Total Economy 
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NB:  
Within =  within firm productivity growth 
between =   productivity growth due to reallocation of labor across existing firms 
entry =   productivity growth due to entry of new firms 
exit =   productivity growth due to exit of firms 
Figure 5.2    Firm-level labor productivity decomposition for Manufacturing 
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 To shed some light on the role for such horizon effects for our cross country data, Table 
9 presents the difference in the components of the decomposition as the horizon increases from 
three to five years for selected countries (unfortunately we only have the decomposition at three 
and five year frequencies for a limited number of countries).  To make the three and five year 
components comparable, the components have all been annualized.  For the selected countries, 
increasing the horizon increases the annual contribution of net entry, decreases the annual 
contribution of the between component and has a mixed impact on the within component.  The 
increase in the net entry component is largest for the transition economies with a relatively large 
increase of almost three percent for Estonia.    For the transition economies at least, these findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that learning and selection effects increase the contribution of 
net entry over a longer horizon.  For Estonia in particular these learning and selection effects are 
apparently quite important. 
Table 9  Horizon Differences 
 Difference in Component from 5 to 3 Years 
Country Net Entry Between Within 
    
Argentina 0.001 -0.001 0.028
Chile 0.002 -0.005 -0.007
Colombia 0.001 -0.005 -0.004
Estonia 0.028 -0.006 -0.007
Latvia 0.019 -0.009 0.027
Slovenia 0.007 -0.001 0.001
 There is also an important sectoral dimension to the process of restructuring, 
reallocation and creative destruction.  Figure 10 presents the productivity decompositions for two 
groups of industries in manufacturing: (i) the low technology industries; and (ii) the medium-high 
technology industries. The large negative cross-term discussed above, i.e. the fact that firms with 
strong productivity growth downsized, is evident in low-tech industries, while in medium 
high-tech industries this effect, albeit still present,  seems to be smaller.  Even more interestingly, 
the contribution of new firms to productivity growth is modest in low-tech industries, and even 
largely negative in a few countries including the US.  But the entry effect is strongly positive in 
medium high-tech industries. This result suggests an important role for new firms in an area 
characterized by stronger technological opportunities.   
 One methodological issue that turns out not to be especially important in most cases is 
the form of the decomposition used for this analysis.  To investigate the sensitivity to the 
decomposition methodology used, Table 10  presents the difference in the net entry component 
(annualized) for the FHK and BG methodologies.  Recall that a key difference is that FHK use 
the initial average productivity of all plants as the base from which to deviate the entering and 
exiting plants productivity while BG use the exiters productivity.  FHK motivate their approach 
as having desirable accounting properties – i.e., entering plants contribute positively to industry 
productivity growth over time if they are above the initial average while exiting plants contribute 
positively to industry productivity growth if they are below the initial average.  BG motivate their 
approach as being more appropriate to the extent that entrants are displacing exiting plants so the 
correct reference group for entrants are the exiting businesses they are displacing.26   For most 
countries the difference is small and for virtually all the difference is positive.  There are a couple 
of countries where the difference is large and positive (Korea, Slovenia and Taiwan (China)). 
                                                          
26.  One technical limitation of this alternative is that this implies in turn that the between component 
uses the exiters as the base for that component and this is difficult to motivate. 
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Figure 10     Productivity decomposition by technology groups  
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  It is intuitive that the effects should in general be small because for both methods the 
net entry term depends critically on the difference between average productivity of entering and 
exiting businesses.  Put differently, both the entry and the exit term subtract off whatever base is 
used, so at first glance it might appear that the base is irrelevant (the base term in each component 
cancels out in the net).  Consistent with this perspective, computing the difference between the 
FHK and BG net entry terms yields: 
 
))(( Xkt
Xi Ni
ktitkit PPBGFHK −
∈ ∈
−− −−=− ∑ ∑θθ       [9] 
where Pt-k  is the average productivity of incumbents and PXt-k is the average productivity of 
exiting businesses in the base year.  Thus, if the share of activity (in this case employment) 
accounted for by entering and exiting businesses is the same then the difference is zero.  As seen 
in section 4, for most countries the share of activity accounted for by entry is about the same as 
that for exit with the latter typically slightly larger since exiting businesses tend to be larger than 
entering businesses.  Thus, this difference in weights does not matter for most countries.  
However, for Korea and to a lesser extent Portugal and Taiwan (China), the share of employment 
accounted for by exit is substantially less than the share of employment accounted for by entry -- 
hence the sensitivity for these countries. 
Table 10: 
FHK-BG 
Difference in 
Net 
entryCountry Net Entry Exit/ Entry Share Incumbent/Exit 
 Difference Difference 
Productivity 
Difference 
Argentina 0.006 -0.012 0.098 
Chile -0.015 -0.022 0.432 
Colombia 0.005 0.008 0.627 
Estonia -0.008 -0.031 0.28 
Finland -0.003 -0.013 0.251 
France 0.004 0.034 0.107 
Korea, Rep. -0.06 -0.122 0.495 
Latvia 0.01 -0.001 -0.037 
Netherlands 0.003 0.028 0.025 
Portugal -0.016 -0.039 0.394 
Slovenia 0.014 0.059 0.252 
Taiwan 
(China) -0.019 -0.077 0.264 
UK 0.008 0.148 0.051 
USA 0.004 0.012 0.299 
West 
Germany 0 0.001 0.274
Notes:  The reported figures are the time series averages.  The first column 
is the product of the second and third column.  However, since the reported 
figures are averages over time, the identity may appear not to hold (the 
product of the averages is not the same as the average of the product). 
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The cross-sectional efficiency of the allocation of activity 
 So far, the creative destruction process has been discussed mostly from the point of 
view of productivity growth.  This is natural in this context since the creative destruction process 
is inherently dynamic.  However, as discussed above and in section 2 at some length, distortions 
in market structure and institutions can distort the entry and exit margins in a variety of ways 
making the interpretation of the dynamic decompositions discussed above difficult.  An 
alternative simpler and more robust approach is to ask the question – are resources allocated 
efficiently in a sector/country in the cross section at a given point in time.  Dynamics can also be 
examined here to the extent that the nature of the efficiency of the cross sectional allocation of 
businesses can vary over time.   
 This approach is based upon a simple cross-sectional decomposition of productivity 
growth developed by Olley and Pakes (1996).  They note that in the cross section, the level of 
productivity for a sector at a point in time can be decomposed as follows: 
it
i i
itittt PPNP ∆∆+= ∑ ∑ θ)/1(        [10] 
where N is the number of businesses in the sector and ∆ is the operator that represents the cross 
sectional deviation of the firm-level measure from the industry simple average.  The simple 
interpretation of this decomposition is that aggregate productivity can be decomposed into two 
terms involving the unweighted average of firm-level productivity plus a cross term that reflects 
the cross-sectional efficiency of the allocation of activity.  The cross term captures allocative 
efficiency since it reflects the extent to which firms with greater efficiency have a greater market 
share.   
 This simple decomposition is very easy to implement and essentially involves just 
measuring the unweighted average productivity vs. the weighted average productivity.  
Measurement problems make comparisons of the levels of either of these measures across sectors 
or countries very problematic but taking the difference between these two measures reflects a 
form of a difference-in-difference approach.  Beyond measurement advantages, this approach 
also has the related virtue that theoretical predictions are more straightforward as well.   
Distortions to market structure and institutions unambiguously imply that the difference between 
weighted and unweighted productivity (or equivalently the cross term) should be smaller.  
 With these remarks in mind, Figure 11 presents the measure of the gap between 
weighted and unweighted average productivity for a sample of countries. The Figure shows the 
difference between the employment-weighted (logarithm of) labor productivity and the 
un-weighted average (logarithm of) labor productivity, and measures how many percent higher 
aggregate manufacturing labor productivity is than average labor productivity of firms in 
manufacturing.  The EU countries enjoy a 25 percent productivity boost from rational allocation 
of resources, but have not seen much change on balance over time. SE Asian economies are on 
top, followed by the U.S., while the Latin American countries, except Argentina, show higher 
productivity boosts through resource allocation than the EU, but lower than in SE Asia. 
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Figure 11  The gap between weighted and un-weighted labor productivity, 1990s   
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 Figure 12 presents the evolution over the 1990s in the transition economies.   As may be 
seen, the transition economies all start out at very low and sometimes negative allocation effects. 
A negative effect means that allocation was worse than that resulting from a toss of the dice: for 
some reason resources were disproportionately allocated towards poor productivity firms. 
However, the transition countries generally exhibit a rapid increase of this ratio over time 
consistent with the view that allocative efficiency improved substantially in the transition 
economies over this time period.  
Figure 12   The evolution of the gap between weighted and un-weighted productivity in 
transition economies over the 1990s 
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Contestability Effects:  The Relationship Between the Pace of Creative Destruction and 
Productivity Growth  
 
 The analysis above focuses on the direct contribution of the reallocation process for 
productivity growth (either with the dynamic or cross sectional decomposition).   These 
decompositions lead one to think about the reallocation contributions and the within firm 
contributions as being alternative explanations of productivity growth.  The reallocation 
contributions are often interpreted in the literature as reflecting the creative destruction processes 
while the within firm are interpreted as reflecting more traditional sources of productivity growth 
(the average firm becomes more productive with advancing technology.  However, rather than 
being alternatives, these effects (within vs. reallocation) may be closely related.  That is, the pace 
of the creative destruction process might be interpreted as a measure of the contestability or 
competitive of markets.  As such, greater competitive pressures may induce incumbents to 
perform more efficiently. 
A first look at such contestability effects is provided in Figure 13.  In this figure, we exploit not 
only the cross country variation but the variation across industries in order to be able to increase 
the number of observations (and since in principle the above arguments should apply across 
sectors as well as countries).  In particular, we examine the relationship between the contribution 
of net entry in a country/sector (using time averages from the country/sector/year data) and the 
productivity growth from incumbents (the within term in the FHK decomposition). Interestingly, 
we find a strong positive and statistically significant correlation between the net entry 
contribution and the productivity growth of incumbents. 
This finding is suggestive that there is a relationship between the creative destructive and within 
firm sources of productivity growth.  If nothing else, this strong correlation suggests that these 
components are not orthogonal alternatives but rather closely related.  It might be, however, that 
the correlation in Figure 13 is readily explained as reflecting the impact of technological advances 
for both continuing firms and for the creative destruction process.  That is, it may be that with 
technological advances we observe incumbents who survive increase productivity and also 
observe entering businesses (who presumably adopt the latest advances) more productive that the 
exiting businesses.   
To focus more on the contestability hypothesis directly, in Figure 14 we examine the relationship 
between the firm turnover rate and the productivity growth of incumbents.  We again find a 
positive and statistically significant correlation.  This latter finding provides more direct evidence 
of a connection between the competitiveness or contestability of markets and the productivity 
growth within incumbent firms.   
A related question is whether the pace of creative destruction is also related to the productivity 
difference between entering and exiting businesses.  Figure 15 shows the relationship between the 
firm turnover rate and the mean difference (unweighted) between the productivity of entering and 
exiting businesses.  We find a strong and positive relationship here as well.27 
                                                          
27.  Given the discussion in section 2, it is possible to justify either a positive or negative correlation.  
On the one hand, a higher firm turnover rate might imply greater dynamism and thus competitive 
forces playing a greater role in determining market selection.  From this perspective, the 
correlation should be positive and since we found this in the data this is the interpretation we are 
pushing.  Alternatively, greater dynamism might also be due to greater randomness in market 
selection and/or greater market experimentation (which adds a form of endogenous randomness).  
Such greater randomness in market selection would imply a negative correlation. 
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These findings together suggest that greater dynamism has a strong payoff in that a higher pace of 
firm turnover is associated both with a higher rate of productivity growth of incumbents and a 
larger difference in the productivity gap between entering and exiting businesses.  Appropriate 
caution needs to be used in drawing causal inferences as these results reflect correlations, not 
causality.  Still, these findings suggest that understanding within firm productivity gains is closely 
connected with understanding the pace of turnover and the gap in productivity between entering 
and exiting businesses. 
Figure 13   The relationship between net entry contribution and the productivity growth of 
incumbents. 
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Figure 14   The relationship between the firm turnover rate and the productivity growth of 
incumbents
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Figure 15   The relationship between the firm turnover rate and the mean productivity 
difference between entering and exiting businesses 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
 In this paper we provide an in-depth analysis of the process of creative destruction 
across 24 countries and 2-digit industries over the past decade.  We rely on a newly assembled 
dataset that draws from different micro data sources (business registers, census, or representative 
enterprise surveys).  The novelty of our approach is in the harmonisation of firm level data across 
countries, which enables international comparisons and the identification of country-specific 
factors as opposed to sectoral and time effects. Our main goal is to assess how certain stylised 
facts presented in the micro-economic literature of creative destruction -- largely relying on U.S. 
data -- are confirmed by evidence from a range of countries, characterised by different economic 
structures, institutions and aggregate growth performances over the period analysed.  
Overall, our data clearly suggest a significant heterogeneity of firms in each market and country. 
This heterogeneity is manifested in large disparities in firm size, firm growth and productivity 
performance.  More in detail, we found: 
 The average size of incumbent firms varies widely across sectors and countries. 
Differences in firm size are largely driven by within-sector differences, although in some 
countries sectoral specialization also plays a significant role. Smaller countries tend to 
have a size distribution skewed towards smaller firms, but the average size of firms as 
well as the dispersion within and across countries do not map precisely with the overall 
dimension of the domestic market. 
 Firm churning is large: gross firm turnover involves 10-20 percent of all firms in 
industrial countries, and even more in transition and other emerging economies.  
Entering, but also exiting, firms tend to be small and thus firm flows affect only about 
5-10 per cent of total employment.  This suggests that the entry of small firms is 
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relatively easy, while larger-scale entry is more difficult but, survival among small firms 
is also more difficult and many small new comers fails before reaching the efficient scale 
of production. 
 Entry and exit rates are part of the same process.  In most countries, entry and exit rates 
are correlated across industries. They are part of a process in which a large number of 
new firms displace a large number of obsolete firms (which may themselves be relatively 
new), without affecting significantly the total number of firms in the market at each point 
in time.  Transition economies and some emerging countries show weaker correlations 
because of stronger structural changes in their economy with declining traditional sectors 
and expanding modern sectors.   
 Market selection is pretty harsh: about 20 to 40 per cent of entering firms fail within the 
first two years of life. Confirming previous results, failure rates decline with duration: 
conditional on surviving the first few years, the probability of survival becomes higher. 
But only about 40-50 per cent of total entering firms in a given cohort survive beyond the 
seventh year.  
 Successful entrants expand rapidly. Surviving firms are not only relatively larger but also 
tend to grow rapidly. The combined effect of exits being concentrated amongst the 
smallest units and the growth of survivors makes the average size of a given cohort to 
increase rapidly towards the efficient scale.  
 Creative destruction is important for promoting productivity growth. While the 
continuous process of restructuring and upgrading by incumbents is essential to boost 
aggregate productivity, the entry of new firms and the exit of obsolete units also play an 
important role.  The contribution of firm churning to productivity is particularly 
important in high-tech industries -- where new technologies are often better harnessed by 
new firms.  
 Creative destruction also promotes market contestability.  A strong process of creative 
destruction also promotes productivity-enhancing strategies of incumbents.  We have 
some preliminary evidence of this “contestability” effect: there is a significant correlation 
between firm turnover rates and incumbent productivity growth across industries and 
countries; and there is also a significant correlation between the net entry contribution to 
productivity and incumbent productivity growth.  In other words, higher firm turnover is 
associated with stronger productivity growth of incumbents, and the more effective the 
process of creative destruction is for productivity, the more it stimulates growth by 
incumbents.       
Our analysis also shows significant differences across countries along the different dimensions of 
our data: size, firm turnover, survival and productivity growth.  These differences can be linked 
together to form a tentative interpretation of the nature and effectiveness of creative destruction in 
different contexts.  
 Industrial countries.  All industrial countries show a marked process of creative 
destruction. There are, however, some distinguishing features.  There is a greater 
heterogeneity of firms in the US compared with European countries, and this 
heterogeneity is also reflected in the composition of entrant firms.  New firms tend to be 
smaller in relative size than incumbents and with lower productivity levels than their 
counterparts in Europe.  But market selection and learning effects imply that successful 
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surviving entrants expand rapidly generating stronger post-entry growth, while low 
productivity entrants exit rapidly freeing resources for new ventures. These features may 
indicate a different degree of market experimentation in the United States compared with 
Europe. Related to this, the European countries exhibit markedly worse static allocation 
of resources than the U.S.  
 Transition economies.  Creative destruction assumes an even stronger role in the five 
Central and Eastern European countries in transition.  The magnitude of firm creation and 
destruction is generally larger than that observed in industrial countries: many new 
smaller firms have been replacing obsolete larger units inherited from the central plan 
period.  Moreover, new firms have filled in new market niches enjoying, especially in the 
early years of transition, less competition and higher survival rates.  But market forces 
have quickly strengthened, with some stabilization and equilibration in entry and exit 
rates, as well as with increasing failure rates among new firms.  The process of resource 
reallocation has become increasingly effective over the transition, shifting resources to 
new but also more productive firms. There are also interesting differences across 
countries.  Hungary as well as some small open economies in transition (Estonia, Latvia 
and Slovenia) have all experienced a strong creative destruction process, with large post 
entry growth and a marked contribution of the new entry (as well as exit) to productivity 
growth. Romania is still dominated by some large firms; entry of new firms have 
increased rapidly in recent years when market reforms were advanced, but even 
successful new firms seem to have difficulty in expanding.  
 Emerging economies of Latin America and East Asia. It is more difficult to trace 
common patterns for the other emerging economies.  Mexico shows strong market 
dynamism, with large entry and exit flows, strong market selection of new entrants and 
strong post entry growth of successful entrants. NAFTA likely created an environment 
that was conducive to such growth. By contrast, Argentina resembles more some 
continental European countries with somewhat lower firm turnover, yet strong market 
selection that however is not associated with large post entry growth of successful firms.  
Moreover, creative destruction seems to play a relatively small role in promoting 
productivity growth.  For the other Latin American countries, data cover only 
manufacturing and firms above a certain size, making comparisons more difficult.  
Finally, Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan (China) all show that creative destruction plays a 
strong role in promoting productivity growth.  
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